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Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain* 
THEA JOHNSON† 
A great deal of criminal law scholarship and practice turns on whether a defendant 
gets a good deal through plea bargaining. But what is a good deal? And how do 
defense attorneys secure such deals? Much scholarship measures plea bargains by 
one metric: how many years the defendant receives at sentencing. In the era of 
collateral consequences, however, this is no longer an adequate metric as it misses 
a world of bargaining that happens outside of the sentence. Through empirical re-
search, this Article examines the measure of a good plea and the work that goes into 
negotiating such a plea. Through in-depth interviews with twenty-five public 
defenders in four states, I investigate the ways in which collateral consequences 
impact the negotiation of the plea. What emerges is a picture of creative plea bar-
gaining that takes into account a host of noncriminal sanctions that fall outside of 
the charge and sentence. Public defenders assess the priorities of their clients 
—regarding both the direct and collateral consequences of the case—and piece to-
gether pleas that meet these varied needs. The length of sentence after a plea does 
not tell the full story about whether a defendant got a good deal because a successful 
plea now encompasses much beyond the final sentence.  
These findings have broad implications for the way we think about assessing 
public defense offices and individual defenders. Much of what goes into a plea 
—particularly at the misdemeanor level—is a product of the client’s desire to avoid 
certain collateral consequences, and those desires generally do not enter the formal 
record or off-the-record negotiations with prosecutors. As a result, pleas that look 
bad on paper may actually be meeting the needs of the client. Therefore, in order to 
assess pleas and the defenders who negotiate them, we must understand the limits of 
publicly available data and focus on creating a more robust data set by which to 
judge public defenders. Additionally, this Article provides a fuller picture of 
prevailing professional norms at the plea phase after Padilla, Lafler, and Frye. As 
courts grapple with the role of the defense attorney during plea bargaining, it is 
critical that they understand that in many cases lawyers achieve optimal outcomes 
by providing advice and advocacy for their clients on concerns outside of the im-
mediate criminal case. Finally, this Article serves as a renewed call for attention and 
funding for the holistic model of public defense.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The classic image of the defender as a trial attorney may still be popular, but the 
reality of public defense has changed. The frequently cited statistics remind us that 
trials are dead1 and that the core work of public defense is plea bargaining.2 Plea 
bargaining today is shaped by many factors but particularly by the cascade of col-
lateral consequences that now result from a criminal conviction. Low-level drug of-
fenses make even lawful permanent residents3 automatically deportable. Drug 
convictions can also influence a person’s ability to stay in public housing or maintain 
student loans.4 Sex crimes offenses, both misdemeanors and felonies, often carry 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
fig.C (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/2010 
/sourcebook-2010 [https://perma.cc/6JQF-DR29] (finding that ninety-seven percent of federal 
criminal cases were resolved by plea in 2010). 
 2. This has been true for decades, in fact. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1979); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s 
Triumph, 109 Yale L.J. 857 (2000). 
 3. A lawful permanent resident is “[a]ny person not a citizen of the United States who 
is living in the U.S. under legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent residence as an 
immigrant. Also known as ‘permanent resident alien,’ ‘resident alien permit holder,’ and 
‘Green Card holder.’” Glossary, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis 
.gov/tools/glossary?topic_id=l [https://perma.cc/XR9J-LQJA] (click “Lawful permanent 
resident” to view definition). 
 4. For a dizzying account of all possible collateral consequences on a state-by-state 
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long-term sex offender registration requirements.5 Although these consequences are 
not new,6 there is a new sense of urgency among courts, scholars, and advocates to 
address them.7  
In recent years, the Supreme Court has begun to fully acknowledge the critical 
role of plea bargaining in the criminal process. In 2010 the Court held in Padilla v. 
Kentucky that defense attorneys are required to give accurate advice to their clients 
about the potential immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.8 Padilla 
acknowledged both the centrality of collateral consequences to the lives of criminal 
defendants and the ability of the defense attorney to plea bargain, in the words of 
Justice Stevens, “creatively” to avoid those consequences.9 
The Padilla decision also made clear that how and why defense attorneys 
negotiate the collateral consequences of the plea remains unexplored. Although 
Justice Stevens pointed to the many ethical and professional standards that govern 
plea bargains,10 there is no data on how criminal defenders incorporate collateral 
consequences into their counsel to clients and decision making on pleas. This Article 
begins to fill that gap. 
Through in-depth interviews with twenty-five public defenders, I explore how 
defenders are collecting information on collateral consequences and how they use 
that information to define the goals and strategies of the plea bargain. My findings 
demonstrate how deeply entangled collateral consequences are in the calculus of plea 
bargaining. The way defenders prepare for and approach the plea bargain is now 
informed by a host of concerns outside of the charge and sentence.  
Traditionally, the most important measures of a plea bargain have been the 
seriousness of the charge and the length of the final sentence.11 In an era of collateral 
consequences, however, defenders are, at times, focusing their energies on mitigating 
consequences rather than on lessening the sentence—particularly when negotiating 
pleas on misdemeanor offenses. To achieve these goals, defenders are bargaining 
creatively, using a variety of both overt and covert strategies. These strategies 
include, among others, trading higher sentences and higher charges for pleas that 
protect the client from severe collateral consequences or “sterilizing” the record to 
shield the client from consequences in noncriminal proceedings down the road.  
                                                                                                                 
 
basis, see generally Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org.   
 5. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a subdiv. 1 (McKinney 2014) (defining sex of-
fender to include individuals convicted of certain misdemeanors); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-
f (McKinney 2014) (requiring sex offenders to register). 
 6. In 1995, for instance, a law review article on effective plea bargaining by Professor 
Rodney J. Uphoff noted that public defenders should “inquire about the defendant’s personal 
situation so counsel can advise the client about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea or 
conviction” because these consequences may actually be more important to the client than the 
sentence handed down by the judge. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as 
Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 100–01 (1995).  
 7. See infra Part I.A.  
 8. 559 U.S 356, 374 (2010). 
 9. Id. at 373. 
 10. Id. at 367–68; see infra Part I.A. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.  
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This sort of creative bargaining is much more common in misdemeanor practice, 
where the sentences tend to be lower.12 And although public defender offices gener-
ally allocate resources to felony practice,13 these findings provide fodder for the 
argument that public defender offices should embrace the holistic defense model, 
which focuses on the myriad legal issues that tend to flow from a criminal case—
misdemeanor or felony.  
In addition, by examining the way in which defenders plea bargain, this Article 
also tests the concept of a “good deal.” By looking only at the traditional metric 
—sentence length—courts and scholars may define “success” in a way that is di-
vorced from the perspective of the defender or the client, or both. As there are so 
many collateral consequences to be negotiated “around,” plea bargains take on 
strange new forms that may look—on paper—like bad decisions, but are actually 
meeting the varied needs of defendants.  
Further, in light of recent attempts to evaluate public defenders by both scholars, 
state oversight committees, and national defender organizations,14 this measure may 
not adequately capture the work that goes into crafting a plea bargain.15 Although 
much attention has been paid to how prosecutors think about pleas and collateral 
consequences,16 the real craftsmen behind plea bargains are the defense attorneys, 
who must weigh the priorities of their clients and come up with pleas that meet those 
needs—whether that means staying out of prison to avoid detection by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), keeping a local government job, or being able to 
secure student aid for college. Given the incredibly individualized nature of the needs 
of each client (the details of which tend never to enter the public record), a “good 
deal” is a moving target that can vary greatly from case to case. Metrics for 
evaluating success must incorporate and reflect all the considerations that inform 
plea bargaining.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. A misdemeanor is defined as a crime that carries a sentence of less than one year. A 
felony must potentially carry a sentence of more than one year, but a sentence of a year or 
more is not mandatory on many felonies.  
 13. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93 DENV. L. REV. 
389, 411 (2016).  
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
 15. As Jason Kreag notes, the regular metric for measuring a prosecutor’s success 
—conviction rates—also does not capture the full range of a prosecutor’s performance.  Jason 
Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).  
 16. Two recent pieces, Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
775 (2016), and Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016), 
both argue that prosecutors are beginning to strategically use collateral consequences in their 
plea negotiations. In addition, scholars like Heidi Altman and Ingrid Eagly have explored the 
way that prosecutors think about immigration consequences, specifically, when negotiating 
and offering pleas. Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of 
Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012) (discussing the results of a survey 
done of district attorneys in Kings County, N.Y. (Brooklyn) District Attorney’s Office and 
how district attorneys incorporate immigration consequences into their decision on pleas); 
Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013) (discussing how different prosecutors’ offices 
take into consideration immigration law when making decisions about how to prosecute 
noncitizens). 
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Using qualitative research, this Article aims to explore the notion of how we 
measure a successful plea bargain in the era of collateral consequences. In Part I, I 
describe the growing awareness of collateral consequences after Padilla and how the 
decision has shaped the conversation about plea bargaining. I also discuss recent 
attempts to evaluate public defender performance. Part II outlines my methodology 
for conducting qualitative interviews with defenders in four cities: New York City, 
Boston, the Seattle area, and Colorado Springs, Colorado. Part III discusses my 
findings about how the public defenders I spoke to are negotiating “around” 
collateral consequences in creative and innovative ways. I first explore the various 
strategies for creative plea bargaining and then examine the challenges to such bar-
gaining. Finally, Part IV will explore the implications of these findings in three re-
spects. First, I reflect on how we should define a successful plea bargain in light of 
these findings and what that definition means for our evaluation of public defenders. 
I argue that evaluation should reflect the work that goes into pleading around 
collateral consequences, particularly at the misdemeanor stage. Second, I discuss the 
implications of the work for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Embedded in 
courts’ jurisprudence about the defense counsel’s duty to advise a client about 
collateral consequences is also a demand for them to bargain creatively around those 
consequences where possible. But my findings show that there are no easy answers 
to the knotty question of what constitutes “prevailing professional norms”17 in an era 
of collateral consequences. Finally, I make a renewed call for the funding and 
embrace of holistic public defense models that make collateral consequences a 
priority.  
I. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND THE MEASURE OF A PLEA 
We have entered an era of collateral consequences. Scholars have noted the deep 
problems with the number and type of collateral consequences that stem from a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
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conviction.18 Courts at every level have taken up the issue.19 In practice, attorneys 
are mindful of their obligations to counsel clients on these concerns and of their 
clients’ desire to avoid collateral consequences. A recent article on Vox.com, I’m a 
Public Defender. My Clients Would Rather Go to Jail than Register as Sex Offenders, 
tells the story of one public defender’s struggle to avoid sex offender registration, 
even in the face of an alternative jail sentence.20 The author notes,  
When I first became a public defender, I believed the worst punishment 
that my clients would face would be time in jail. Since then, I’ve learned 
that incarceration is not the only—and perhaps not the worst 
—punishment the criminal justice system can impose. The registration 
requirements imposed on those convicted of sex offenses are unfairly 
harsh and punitive . . . . 21  
In addition, the impact of collateral consequences has become part of the 
mainstream narrative about criminal justice reform. For instance, pieces on National 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013) (discussing the expansion of immigration consequences for 
low-level crimes and the struggle for public defenders to provide effective assistance under 
these circumstances, inevitably leading to poor outcomes and unwarranted deportations for 
defendants); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and 
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697 (2002) (discussing why effective 
assistance of counsel claims should reach the many collateral consequences that are the result 
of a criminal conviction); John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal 
Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55 (2013) (arguing that Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence must take into account the punishments, beyond incarceration, that flow from a 
conviction); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting 
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 464–65 (2010) (finding, in a comparative 
examination of countries with similar criminal justice systems to the United States, that the 
U.S. has a more punitive set of collateral consequences); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. 
Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An 
Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586 (2006) (noting that although “civil 
disabilit[y]” consequences of a conviction are considered collateral to a defendant’s prison 
sentence, their permanent and pervasive nature often outlast the direct consequence, both 
temporally and in severity); Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise: Ensuring 
Noncitizen Defendants Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal 
Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 169, 176 (2011) (arguing that as the number and type of 
criminal charges that make a person removable increased, the grounds for relief from removal 
decreased, creating an immigration system that was deeply entwined with the criminal 
system).  
 19. Some courts have extended the holding of Padilla beyond immigration. See, e.g., 
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Padilla also applies to 
sex offender registration). But see Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 353 (Pa. 2012) 
(reversing a lower court decision which held that counsel was ineffective for not warning his 
client of the possible loss of his pension as a result of the conviction). 
 20. Rachel Marshall, I’m a Public Defender. My Clients Would Rater Go to Jail than 
Register as Sex Offenders., VOX.COM (July 5, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/7/5/12059448 
/sex-offender-registry [https://perma.cc/AH6A-SLLS]. 
 21. Id. 
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Public Radio22 and Last Week Tonight with John Oliver23 focus on the devastation of 
collateral consequences.24  
Despite this attention, there is still confusion about what exactly should be labeled 
a “collateral consequence.” It is not always clear—to clients, attorneys, and even 
courts—what is “direct” and what is “collateral.” The National Inventory of the 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction (hereinafter NICCC) defines collateral 
consequences as “the penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages imposed upon a person 
as a result of a criminal conviction, either automatically by operation of law or by 
authorized action of an administrative agency or court on a case by case basis.”25 
These include losing the ability “to vote or obtain certain licenses.”26 In contrast, a 
direct consequence is defined as one that “is imposed by the sentencing court as part 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Monica Haymond, Should a Criminal Record Come with Collateral Consequences?, 
NPR.ORG (Dec. 6, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/06/368742300/should-a 
-criminal-record-come-with-collateral-consequences [https://perma.cc/3F6Q-RSDP].  
 23. LastWeekTonight, Prisoner Re-Entry, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJtYRxH5G2k [https://perma.cc/2XAQ-R5C8]. 
 24. It’s worth noting that the acknowledgment that collateral consequences are a “big 
deal” is part of a growing awareness of other systematic issues in the criminal justice system. 
For instance, the injustice of the system of criminal fines and fees, and the misuse of bail 
against indigent defendants, are likewise problems that have existed in the system for some 
time but are now on the radar of academics and the general population. Beth A. Colgan, Re-
viving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 285–90 (2014) (reviewing the 
common and often debilitating fines that defendants are often forced to pay); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1346–47 (2012) (discussing the pressures 
that setting bail places on defendants). But it is not only the academy and lawyers focusing on 
these hot-button issues in criminal justice. For example, both fines and bail have gotten 
treatment by Last Week Tonight with John Oliver. The segment on fines, LastWeekTonight, 
Municipal Violations: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UjpmT5noto [https://perma.cc/AGJ3-46ED], and the 
episode on bail, LastWeekTonight, Bail: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), 
YOUTUBE (June 7, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS5mwymTIJU 
[https://perma.cc/YU4K-7UTE], have each been viewed over six million times on YouTube, 
as of this publication. Many other nontraditional sources of criminal justice reform coverage 
have engaged in long-form, in-depth coverage of these subjects recently, thrusting them even 
further into the spotlight. See, e.g., Bill Keller, Prison Revolt, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2015),  
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/prison-revolt [https://perma.cc/TG5H-V2JU]; 
Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. BOOKS  (May 21, 
2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/may/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/ 
[https://perma.cc/SJ6L-PC9W]; Matt Taibbi, Jailed for Being Broke, ROLLING STONE (June 
23, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/jailed-for-being-broke-20150623 [https:// 
perma.cc/P9X4-ZM8E]. Even the recent arrival of the criminal justice reporting-based website 
and newsletter The Marshall Project, edited by former New York Times Editor-in-Chief Bill 
Keller, signifies a sea change in the attention devoted to the simmering issues in criminal 
justice. Our People, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/people 
[https://perma.cc/293F-AKFN]. 
 25. Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, User Guide & Frequently Asked Questions, 
NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), https://niccc 
.csgjusticecenter.org/user_guide/ [https://perma.cc/683K-GAUN]. 
 26. Id. 
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of the authorized punishment, and included in the court’s judgment.”27 This includes, 
for example, the imposition of a fine. 
Immigration consequences, in fact, are considered—as the majority noted in 
Padilla—neither collateral nor direct.28 Instead the Supreme Court found that the risk 
of deportation is too important to the defendant to be considered collateral, but does 
not qualify as direct since it is not imposed by the judge.29 The Court’s inability to 
put immigration consequences neatly into one box or the other exacerbates the 
confusion that attorneys face on the ground.  
I use the term collateral in this piece to cover a number of consequences, 
including deportation, that may fall in this gray area. I do this because public de-
fenders themselves use the term to encompass a wide range of client concerns that 
fall outside of the sentence length and conviction charge.30  
In asking public defenders about the most common collateral consequences they 
deal with in practice, the answers were far-ranging, giving some sense of the scope 
of what defenders encounter. Immigration was at the top of the list, but defenders 
also listed probation and parole, sex offender registration, loss of custody of children, 
loss of a job or housing, and the stigma of being convicted of a crime, to name just a 
few. This list, though, is just the tip of the iceberg. A review of the NICCC shows 
that there are 711 potential collateral consequences that may stem from a criminal 
conviction in Colorado, 814 in Massachusetts, 1027 in Washington State, and 1314 
in New York.31  
These interviews make clear that collateral has come to encompass a world of 
client concerns that spring from the criminal conviction, but are still apart from it.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010). 
 29. The Court noted that deportation is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or 
collateral consequence.” Id. But the majority was clear that the Court has never distinguished 
between a direct and collateral consequence in making Strickland inquiries. Id. at 365. 
 30. The first question I asked interviewees during the interviews was what collateral 
consequences they deal with most commonly in their practice. I did not define collateral, 
keeping the answer open to what came to mind when they heard the term collateral conse-
quence. Here is a list of all collateral consequences that defenders brought up and how fre-
quently they were mentioned as a common consequence: immigration (22); housing (14); 
employment (13); licensing (including both driver’s licensing and professional licensing) (12); 
student financial aid (6); parole/probation (3); Family Court consequences (3); sex offender 
registration (3); impact on future cases (3); school suspension (2); loss of benefits (2); loss of 
the vote (1); loss of firearm privileges (1); stigma (1).  
 31. Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, Colorado, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=3 
[https://perma.cc/6Z9S-2C5G]; Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, Massachusetts, NAT’L 
INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org 
/search/?jurisdiction=25 [https://perma.cc/E8LF-JDUR]; Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, 
New York, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), 
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=35 [https://perma.cc/PW8T-E9NL]; 
Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, Washington, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION (2016), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=48 
[https://perma.cc/3CE3-ZTCH]. 
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A. Padilla and the Evolution of Creative Plea Bargaining 
Part of the reason that collateral consequences and plea bargains are having their 
moment is because of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. 
Padilla involved a lawful permanent resident who was prosecuted in Kentucky for 
transporting a large amount of marijuana.32 Before trial, he pleaded guilty on the 
advice of his attorney, who told him that he did not need to worry about immigration 
consequences because he had been in the United States for over forty years.33 That 
advice was wrong. The drug conviction made the defendant’s deportation “virtually 
mandatory.”34 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the defendant’s request for 
post-conviction relief, holding that the Sixth Amendment did not protect him from 
erroneous advice about deportation because removal from the country was a collat-
eral consequence of a conviction.35 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and found 
that defense counsel has a Sixth Amendment duty to give correct immigration advice 
to a noncitizen defendant when the law is clear about the nature of the immigration 
consequence.36 Where the law is not clear, the Court found that defense counsel 
would satisfy the duty where he gave a more general warning to his client that there 
may be immigration consequences as a result of his conviction.37  
Padilla was decided on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Under the test 
laid out in Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show, first, that his attorney 
“made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaran-
teed . . . by the Sixth Amendment” and, second, that “counsel’s errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”38 The first prong of the test, often referred 
to as the reasonableness prong, takes into account a totality of the circumstances, 
including “prevailing professional norms.”39 For the second part of the test, or the 
prejudice prong, the Court found that a defendant must show that the “decision 
reached [by the fact-finder] would reasonably likely have been different absent the 
errors [of the lawyer].”40  
  Justice Stevens found that the first prong of Strickland—regarding prevailing 
professional norms—was the locus of the issue in Padilla.41 In Padilla’s case, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. 559 U.S. at 359. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 359–60.  
 36. Id. at 369. 
 37. Id. at 369, 374–75 (reversing and remanding to determine whether there was prejudice 
under the second prong of Strickland).  
 38. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 688. The Court has since elaborated on Strickland by referring to prevailing 
standards of professional norms. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–25 (2003) 
(citing American Bar Association guidelines to determine scope of counsel’s duty to investi-
gate mitigating circumstances). 
 40. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Applying the test to the facts in Strickland, the Court 
found that the defendant failed to satisfy either prong: his lawyer had made a reasonable 
“strategic choice” in focusing on the defendant’s remorse before the judge, and the other 
evidence was not strong enough to have likely made a difference in the outcome. Id. at 698–99. 
 41. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
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immigration statute at play was explicit: drug-related convictions result in deporta-
tion. Because the law was clear, there was a duty for defense counsel to give correct 
advice.42 Stevens acknowledged many of the basic realities facing noncitizens in 
criminal proceedings today. He noted the limited discretion judges have to grant 
noncitizens relief from removal.43 He rightly pointed out that removal was nearly 
inevitable for noncitizens who were convicted of removable offenses.44 As such, 
deportation had become a critical part—perhaps the most important part—of the 
penalty that might be imposed on a noncitizen defendant.45  
Justice Stevens also noted that the inclusion of immigration consequences in the 
plea negotiation could work in favor of both the defendant and the prosecutor.46 This 
perspective was also on view in the 2012 companion cases of Missouri v. Frye and 
Lafler v. Cooper, where the Court held that a defense lawyer may be ineffective 
where his deficient advice resulted in rejection of a favorable plea bargain.47 In Frye 
the Court wrote that “the potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and 
for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing 
means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.”48 
But it is in Padilla that the contours of the creative plea bargain—one that allows 
a defendant to escape collateral consequences through the careful fashioning of the 
plea—begin to emerge. As Justice Stevens noted towards the end of his opinion, 
“Counsel . . . may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to 
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by 
avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal con-
sequence.”49 In this conception of plea bargaining, Stevens also makes clear that a 
good bargain is one in which the defendant avoids certain immigration penalties.  
In this sense, Padilla articulates a different notion of a “bargain” than courts 
normally apply when looking at the deal the client received in the plea. Courts, in 
examining ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargain phase, primarily focus 
on the lesser sentence that the defendant received as the result of the plea.50 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Id. at 366–69. 
 43. Id. at 363–64. 
 44. Id. at 364. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 373 (“[The] informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit 
both the State and noncitizen defendants during the plea-bargain process.”). 
 47. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
1388 (2012).  
 48. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 49. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. 
 50. United States v. Cobb, 110 F. Supp. 3d 591, 599 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (considering what 
constitutes effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargain phase and noting that to 
show prejudice, a defendant must show “the reasonable probability of two things: (1) that he 
would have pled guilty had he known of his true sentencing exposure, and (2) that, had he pled 
guilty, he would have received a lesser sentence”); Nicholson v. United States, No. 09-cr-474 
(RJS), 2014 WL 4693615, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (“Notwithstanding Petitioner’s 
arguments to the contrary, the Court finds that counsel’s advice with respect to these issues 
was not objectively unreasonable and that Petitioner did indeed benefit from the Plea 
Agreement. As consideration for the stipulated Guidelines range and appellate waiver, the 
government consented to dismiss [certain charges], thereby reducing Petitioner’s maximum 
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not explicitly, Padilla appears to expand the definition of a “good deal” to include 
avoiding collateral consequences.  
Padilla also presents a debate between Justice Stevens in the majority and Justice 
Alito in the concurrence over the role of the defense attorney in securing this new 
type of bargain. In fact, much of the discussion in Padilla is about how, when, and 
whether defense attorneys are already advising their clients about immigration issues 
and incorporating these concerns into their plea practice. As Stevens opined, the 
decision would likely have little impact on practice because “[f]or at least the past 
15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to 
provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s plea.”51 Relying on the 
publicly available policies of large defender organizations and ABA Standards, the 
majority surmised that defense attorneys were actually already providing 
immigration advice to their clients.52 The concurrence disputed this, noting that 
guideline mandates do not always equal on-the-ground compliance: “[W]e must 
recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather 
than an empirical assessment of actual practice.”53 
B. Measuring Practice and Pleas 
Padilla then leaves us with two questions, first a question of practice, and second 
a question of measurement. The practice question is whether or not attorneys were 
or are actually advising clients about potential immigration or other collateral 
                                                                                                                 
 
exposure from [fifty-five] to forty-five years. That dismissal, coupled with the government’s 
implicit agreement to forego additional substantive charges . . . gave Petitioner the certainty 
that he would not receive a sentence greater than forty-five years. Given his age and life ex-
pectancy, that concession was not insignificant, as it gave Petitioner the hope that he might at 
least not die in prison.”); Colbert v. United States., No. 3:10-CR-151-R, 2014 WL 5437072, 
at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2014) (stating that to show ineffective assistance during plea 
bargaining, “defendant “also must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for these 
errors by [his] attorney . . . , the government would have entered into the proposed plea 
agreement, the agreement would have been accepted by the Court, which would have imposed 
a more favorable sentence pursuant to the agreement than the one imposed following 
[defendant’s] unsuccessful jury trial” (emphasis added)). Although this is not always the case. 
Two states, Colorado and New Mexico, already held that an attorney could violate the Sixth 
Amendment by failing to inform a client about deportation risks or other collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527–29 (Colo. 1987); State v. 
Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004). 
 51. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
 52. “The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must 
advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.” Id. at 367 (citing, among other documents, 
NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSN., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE D10, H8–H9 (2000); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 197 (3d 
ed. 1993); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 116 
(3d ed. 1999)).  
 53. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 377 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
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consequences,54 which is intimately connected to a broader concern about effective 
assistance of counsel.55 As Justice Alito noted, this question is separate and apart 
from the written standards and policies that dictate how lawyers should behave.56 
The profession has aspirations, but what is the reality?  
The second question is, what makes a good bargain? How do we measure whether 
a defendant has received a good deal? Relatedly, how do we measure whether a 
defense attorney is getting a good deal for his client? And how can one use analytic 
data review to answer these questions when there is no uniform understanding of a 
“good deal”?  
 These are the sorts of questions that scholars and defender offices have been 
grappling with.57 Both groups have started to embrace analytic data review to figure 
out the answer. Data analysis has become increasingly influential in all areas of 
criminal justice reform,58 including in the assessment of public defenders. There is, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Although I use Padilla as a jumping off point to think about how we define successful 
practice and pleas, my scope goes beyond immigration consequences. While the Padilla 
decision was limited to immigration consequences, the issues that Padilla raises are relevant 
to all collateral consequences. In fact, some courts have applied Padilla to consequences other 
than immigration. See supra note 19. And whether it is overtly stated, attorneys are viewing 
their role as extending beyond advisement on immigration to a broader set of categories. See 
infra Part IV.B. 
 55. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013) 
(arguing that Padilla supports a right to effective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining); 
Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to Defense Counsel Who Plea 
Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 132 (2014) (arguing that, considering the nature of 
the modern criminal justice system and following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Frye and 
Lafler, “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel imposes upon 
defense attorneys an obligation to pursue a beneficial plea bargain, when doing so is in the 
defendant’s best interest”). 
 56. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 377. 
 57. Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Prac-
tice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 335–36 (2015). 
 58. Data review gained public recognition in the criminal field with the development of 
Compstat, a data-driven model for detecting high crime areas that was first used by the New 
York City Police Department but was later adopted by many jurisdictions around the country. 
Compstat was hailed for its ability to point law enforcement to hot spots of criminal activity. 
It was also the source of significant criticism. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 540, 592–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (examining the history of Compstat and how its use, 
or abuse, put an emphasis on the number of stops made by New York City police officers, not 
on the quality of the stops, contributing to what the court found to be an illegal and 
unconstitutional practice of stop and frisks). As any fan of The Wire will remind you, Compstat 
is susceptible to officers who want to “game” the numbers. The Wire: Time After Time (HBO 
television broadcast Sept. 19 2004); see also Radley Balco, The Other Broken Windows 
Fallacy, REASON.COM (Mar. 8, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/03 
/08/the-other-broken-window-fallac [https://perma.cc/LL6Q-GNRC] (noting that “[o]ne of 
the central themes of the critically acclaimed HBO series The Wire was the pressure politicians 
put on police brass, who then apply it to the department’s middle management, to generate 
PR-friendly statistics about lowering crime and increasing arrests”). But some police 
departments are also turning to big data to try to identify and then intervene early with “bad 
cops.” Kimbriell Kelly, Can Big Data Stop Bad Cops?, WASH. POST, (Aug. 21, 2016), 
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understandably, a desire to figure out what makes a good public defender (and a bad 
one) and, relatedly, what makes for good client outcomes. Even before the move to 
wide-scale data review in the criminal system, scholars have been trying to measure 
the success of public defenders for decades,59 particularly whether they are achieving 
better outcomes than their private counterparts.60 Many of these studies have focused 
on measuring the final sentence that the defendant received. As Wright and Peebles 
note, the studies that focused on sentencing are premised on the idea that “[i]f two 
clients are convicted of the same crime, despite the efforts of equally active and 
empathetic defense lawyers, the client who receives the lower sentence would 
presumably rate that attorney more highly.”61 But the results of these studies have 
often been in conflict. Some have found that private attorneys are more effective than 
public defenders and some have not. Some concluded that experience makes for 
better criminal defense lawyers and others have not.62  
It is no surprise then that an interest in more complex, nuanced data analysis has 
now come to public defense, even if, as Jennifer Laurin notes, public defense is late 
to the “data game.”63 In their piece Defending Data, Pamela Metzger and Andrew 
Ferguson make a compelling case for incorporating data collection and review into 
public defense assessment.64 They advocate for a systems approach, like the ones 
used in medicine and aviation, which “looks to larger organizational systems for both 
cause and cure [for error].”65 They rightly note that defenders now exist in a “data-
less” environment in which there are few mechanisms to track positive and negative 
                                                                                                                 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/can-big-data-stop-bad-cops/2016/08/21/12db0728 
-3fb6-11e6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html [https://perma.cc/RJK7-C83F]. And big data may 
help alleviate discriminatory policing practices. Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & 
David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017). 
 59. For studies on public defense from the 1970s to the 1990s, see generally Ronald F. 
Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A Demonstration Project, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1237–39, nn.61, 63 (2013).  
 60. See, e.g., N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FY07 NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC 
DEFENDER AND PRIVATE ASSIGNED COUNSEL COST ANALYSIS 2–3 (2008), http://www.ncids 
.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Prior%20Publications/fy07%20pd%20pac%20cba%20final%20 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPF4-U95B] (comparing costs and outcomes between public 
defenders and private counsel); Joyce S. Sterling, Retained Counsel Versus the Public 
Defender: The Impact of Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
151, 160–62 (William F. McDonald ed. 1983) (comparing outcomes between public defenders 
and retained counsel); Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at 
Weak Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 258 (1989) 
(comparing the outcomes at plea bargain between private and public defenders).  
 61. Wright & Peeples, supra note 59, at 1238 (discussing the studies that focus on the 
length of prison or jail sentence as a measure of attorney quality).  
 62. Id. at 1240 (discussing the various conflicting studies on public defenders over the 
last few decades).  
 63. Laurin, supra note 57, at 336–37.  
 64. Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1057 (2015). 
 65. Id. at 1063. 
914 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:901 
 
outcomes.66 Their solution is for public defender organizations to begin the wide-
scale collection of data.67 While they recognize many of the pitfalls of using data 
analysis to measure public defense,68 they argue that the analysis of a range of data 
will improve client outcomes.69 
This call has been echoed by practitioners, other scholars, and state oversight 
committees. For instance, in 2014, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
published Basic Data Every Defender Program Needs To Track: A Toolkit for 
Defender Leaders.70 The “toolkit” encourages organizations to track a wide variety 
of data about cases, clients, and defenders, partly to evaluate case outcomes.71 The 
list of suggested data to collect includes the cases handled by the office, defendant 
characteristics, case events, and case dispositions, among others.72 Interestingly, it 
does not mention collateral consequences.  
As states have begun to implement oversight committees to track the work and 
spending of public defender offices, a focus on data analysis has become increasingly 
relevant to policy decisions on indigent defense.73 In 2012, as Missouri public de-
fenders refused to take on additional cases because of case overload, a state auditor 
argued that the public defender’s estimate of the appropriate caseload was 
unsupported by any data.74 The use of data analysis to evaluate public defenders was 
also, under President Obama, a federal priority. President Obama’s 2015 budget 
called for funding to “launch statistical collections which examine public defender 
agencies, programs and operations,” among a limited number of other criminal 
justice priorities.75 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Id. at 1066. 
 67. Id. at 1097.  
 68. Id. at 1073. For instance, as Metzger and Ferguson note, particular issues of uniform 
data collection at public defender offices depend on the state and county where the office is 
located. Id. at 1074. In addition, 
[s]ome defender systems provide ‘horizontal’ representation, [where a defender 
represents a client at a particular stage of the proceedings,] some ‘vertical,’ 
[where a defender represents the client from start to finish of the proceedings,] 
some ‘holistic.’ Some indigent defense systems are staffed by full time lawyers, 
others by part-time attorneys, still others by contractually assigned counsel. 
Id. 
 69. Id. at 1082–84. 
 70. MAREA BEEMAN, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ORG., BASIC DATA EVERY DEFENDER 
PROGRAM NEEDS TO TRACK: A TOOLKIT FOR DEFENDER LEADERS (2014), http://www 
.nlada100years.org/sites/default/files/BASIC%20DATA%20TOOLKIT%2010-27-14%20Web 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NW7-QVER]; see also Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: 
The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1323 
(2013).  
 71. BEEMAN, supra note 70, at 5.  
 72. Id. at 8–9 
 73. For an overview of the state oversight committees in New York, North Carolina, and 
Texas and their use of data, see Laurin, supra note 57, at 338–54.  
 74. THOMAS A. SCHWEICH, MO. STATE AUDITOR’S OFFICE, MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 10 (2012), http://app.auditor.mo.gov/Repository/AnnualReport/2012annualreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7TT-WL55]. 
 75. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
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In addition, scholars have proposed that criminal justice actors begin to collect 
data in a systematized way, particularly public defenders. The Albany Law Review 
recently published an issue dedicated to the exploration of how data can be used more 
effectively to evaluate indigent defense.76 In the issue, scholars discussed, among 
other topics, tools for assessing holistic defense offices77 as well as the results of 
research on public defense made possible by funding from the National Institute of 
Justice.78 Others have noted that the lack of data in the public defense field represents 
a problem seen throughout the criminal justice system.79 
These calls for data collection and reporting are important and timely. As Samuel 
Wiseman points out, currently there is minimal data collected within the criminal 
justice system, particularly in comparison to other areas of the law, where robust 
datasets have been developed and used.80 There is tremendous value to collecting 
and analyzing data. But as the system turns towards data collection, it is critical to 
keep in mind that publicly available data may not reflect the full range of decision 
making at the plea bargain stage. There is much that goes into a plea that is never put 
down on paper, including the many collateral consequences that may be a priority to 
the client. This makes it difficult to account for the factors that lead to the plea 
decision and to measure the outcome. What makes a good defense attorney and what 
makes a good plea are complicated questions in the era of collateral consequences. 
Further, how defenders think about collateral consequences when negotiating pleas 
depends on many moving pieces: the initial charge, the prosecutor assigned to the 
case, the judge in the courtroom on the day of the plea, and, most importantly, the 
individualized needs of the client. As I discuss below, my findings have broad 
implications for the way we think about plea bargaining in the era of collateral 
consequences.  
                                                                                                                 
 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 294 (2015), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2015-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2015-BUD.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MK8J-LB5Z]. 
 76. SPECIAL ISSUE ON RESEARCH IN INDIGENT DEFENSE (Albany Law Review ed., 2015); 
Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies, Editor’s Introduction, How Do We “Do Data” in Public De-
fense?, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2015).  
 77. Cynthia G. Lee, Brian J. Ostrom & Matthew Kleiman, The Measure of Good Lawyer-
ing: Evaluating Holistic Defense in Practice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1215 (2015).  
 78. Nadine Frederique, Patricia Joseph & R. Christopher C. Hild, What Is the State of 
Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide? A Brief Overview and Suggestions for 
Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1317 (2015).  
 79. For instance, Samuel Wiseman argues for a federal platform that would allow local 
courts to uniformly collect a wide range of data, including demographic information about the 
defendant and information about the case from arraignment to sentence. Samuel R. Wiseman, 
The Criminal Justice Black Box, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017). He notes that the 
collection of bulk data could help identify constitutional violations at the local level—for 
instance whether certain jurisdictions are not providing legal counsel to defendants or 
providing counsel very late in the criminal process. Id. Jason Kreag proposes mandatory 
collecting and reporting of data about prosecutors in order to learn how prosecutors make 
charging and plea bargaining decisions. Kreag, supra note 15. 
 80. Wiseman, supra note 79. 
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II. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
I have used a qualitative empirical approach to explore these questions about pleas 
and practice. I suspected that there were subtleties to measuring the value of a plea 
that may not be explained through quantitative methods. My suspicion that 
quantitative data was not ideal for discovering how public defenders negotiate 
around collateral consequences was borne out in these interviews. For instance, as 
one public defender told me, they might negotiate for a plea that seems good “on 
paper” but might carry very negative immigration consequences for the client.81 Hav-
ing never shared the client’s immigration status with the court or the district attorney, 
this plea might seem, from an outsider’s perspective, like a “good deal,” but is 
actually a nonoptimal outcome for the client.  
I am also following in the tradition of Albert Alschuler, who, in a trio of articles 
from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, explored the role of the defense attorney, the 
prosecutor, and the judge at plea bargaining through the use of interviews.82 The 
present study is an attempt to identify how a particular legal historical moment—
Padilla and the ascendance of the collateral consequence—impacted plea bargaining. 
It is also an effort to continue weaving a thread that Alschuler began nearly half a 
century ago. I am also intrigued by the insights of modern scholars in the field who 
have used interview techniques to understand how and why lawyers make decisions. 
For instance, Ronald Wright and Kay Levine, in their piece on how prosecutors 
develop professionally throughout their careers, show the sort of depth a researcher 
can achieve through interviewing.83   
I spoke to twenty-five public defenders84 in interviews ranging from twenty-five 
minutes to two hours.85 All interviews were confidential so that the interviewees 
would feel comfortable talking about how they make decisions that are very often 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Interview 15. 
 82. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 
1179 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 50 (1968); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976).  
 83. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (2014) (finding that over the course of their careers prosecutors often 
become more balanced in their perspective on their jobs). 
 84. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH 290 (2015) (“In qualitative fieldwork studies, 
there is no easy way to determine how many interviews are needed for the set. Some social 
scientists recommend between twenty and fifty, depending on the dimensions of the 
phenomena, including, for example, the logical variation in the subject of study.” (endnote 
omitted)). 
 85. The interview protocol was reviewed by and received permission from the Stanford 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Interviews occurred in person, via phone, or via Skype. In 
some in-person interviews, defenders opted to be interviewed together. The interviews were 
semi-structured. Interviewees were asked a series of questions, but their particular answers 
often led to follow-up questions specific to the particular interview. All interviews were rec-
orded in handwritten notes and, where allowed by the interviewee, with an audio recording. 
Two interviewees opted not to have the interview recorded. Due to technical difficulties, one 
interview was not recorded in its entirety.  
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private and shared only with their clients and colleagues.86 This was also to ensure 
that they felt safe discussing where they get things right and where they might get 
things wrong.87 Because of this promise of confidentiality, I use the pronoun they, 
rather than he or she, when discussing what a particular public defender told me.88 In 
the attached appendix, I also list the location of practice and number of years within 
a time frame (for instance, zero to three years, four to seven years, etc.) that each 
defender has practiced criminal defense.  
I picked two locations on the East Coast, one on the West Coast, and one in the 
western region of the country. Different jurisdictions take different approaches to 
plea bargaining. On one end of the spectrum is New York City, where many de-
fenders felt comfortable bringing up collateral consequences in conversation with 
both district attorneys and judges.89 On the other end was Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, where public defenders seemed loath to bring up immigration conse-
quences, even in off-the-record conversations.90 Though there were differences spe-
cific to each place, generally, there were recurring themes among the responses from 
which it is possible to draw some generalizable conclusions, particularly about the 
nature of plea bargaining and the concerns public defenders face about collateral 
consequences. Demographic details about the participants of the study can be found 
in the Appendix.  
The reader will notice—and may be troubled by—the absence of any discussion 
about how defendants think about pleas. This is an article about public defenders. I 
am interested in the role of the defense attorney as a repeat player, who negotiates 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pleas in his or her career.91 Because of this repetition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. For this reason, citations to particular interviews are listed by interview number. For 
the corresponding location and number of years in practice for each interviewee, refer to the 
Appendix. In addition, to ensure confidentiality, all interviewees were assured that both the 
written notes and audio recordings of the interviews would be destroyed after the completion 
and publication of the research. 
 87. Public defenders are often overworked and I did not want these conversations to feel 
like an accounting of the quality of their work. Rather, I wanted them to be honest about the 
nature of their work. 
 88. This is particularly important since, interestingly, of the twenty-five interviews I con-
ducted, only three were with men. In general women were much more responsive to my 
requests for interviews. Whether this was simply chance or reflects that female public de-
fenders were predisposed to assist a female researcher is not clear. Given, however, this im-
balance in the gender of my subjects, I am particularly careful not to identify the gender of the 
interviewee via pronouns.  
 89. For more, see infra Part III.B.2; see also Altman, supra note 16. 
 90. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 91. There are limits to this qualitative research method. Interviewees varied in their 
responsiveness to questions, and there is the risk of bias and self-interest in these interviews. 
This was not a randomized sample. Nor was it a random sample of locations. Interviewees 
came to me through word of mouth and therefore there was self-selection among those public 
defenders who agreed to speak to me. I recognize also that those who agreed to speak to me 
may also be those who already have a practice that addresses collateral consequences. As a 
result, the findings I discuss here are emergent trends in the practice of public defense but may 
not represent the practice of all public defenders across the country, or even across a particular 
state.  
918 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:901 
 
and because defendants do not negotiate their own pleas, the defense attorney is 
better able to evaluate the quality of a deal and to explain the decisions that went into 
the negotiation of the deal. I am also interested in providing context for the way 
attorneys make decisions and so I want to understand what lawyers are doing on the 
ground.  
This Article, though, is also about how public defenders interact and negotiate 
with judges, district attorneys, and, most importantly, their clients. The relationship 
between clients and defense attorneys is one of the most sacred in our legal system. 
Trust between the two contributes to the legitimacy of the criminal process.92 In the-
ory, public defenders speak for their clients.93 The reality is, of course, more com-
plex. This Article does not address whether clients actually feel that their public 
defenders have achieved their desired results. Rather, I examine the ways in which 
public defenders themselves perceive their clients’ priorities and how they achieve 
goals based on those priorities. I recognize that there can be a mismatch between 
client goals and the defender’s perception of those goals.94 For the most part, 
however, the defenders I interviewed responded in ways that made clear their 
commitment to do right by their clients.95  
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 286 (2011) (“[T]he relationship between a 
person charged with a misdemeanor and defense counsel is a meaningful part of the overall 
experience that person has with the criminal justice system. . . . Inadequate assistance of 
counsel in criminal cases affects both the individual’s and the public’s perception of the 
criminal justice system’s legitimacy, which may undermine future willingness to obey the law.”). 
 93. For a powerful critique of this general rule, see generally Alexandra Natapoff, Speech-
less: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005).  
 94. For a discussion of the barriers to communication between defenders and their clients, 
see Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access, and 
Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 27–29 (2015).  
 95. The reader will also notice that federal public defenders and private defense attorneys 
are missing from the sample. I was interested in examining how defenders working under 
pressure in difficult conditions negotiate, given the number and variety of collateral con-
sequences they have to deal with in what is generally a short time frame. That defenders triage 
cases is a well-known and controversial reality of the job. John B. Mitchell, In (Slightly 
Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925 (2005). 
Does the triage of cases affect which collateral consequences defenders devoted time to 
reviewing with the client? Or does it influence how they asked questions in a hurried ar-
raignment shift?  
In 2013, a report by the New York Office of Indigent Legal Services found that the average 
caseload of public defenders in upstate New York had been 719, and attorneys for six New 
York State public defender offices averaged 1200–1600 cases. OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL 
SERVS., AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF COMPLIANCE WITH MAXIMUM NATIONAL CASELOAD 
LIMITS IN UPSTATE NEW YORK 10 (2013), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Estimate 
%20of%20Upstate%20Cost%20Of%20Compliance%20Report%20Nov%202013.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7RMX-LLNY]. Attorneys at one provider averaged more than 1600 cases per year. Id.  
I was also interested in hearing from defenders who carry caseloads of misdemeanors, or 
relatively low-level crimes. My research, and the research of others, demonstrates that mis-
demeanors provide much greater leverage for plea bargaining than felonies. See, e.g., Ronald 
F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. 
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This work is the beginning of a larger project. These interviews lay the foundation 
for future work, particularly survey work with a much larger sample population.96 
As Jessica Sibley notes about her qualitative work, “[w]hen the purpose of an 
empirical study is exploratory and hypothesis generating . . . qualitative methods are 
useful to ‘develop insights about the underlying forms and dynamics of the 
phenomenon under study.’”97 These interviews have developed just such a rich 
underlying base. They give us grounds for future exploration in the area.  
III. CREATIVE PLEA BARGAINING AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
What public defenders consider a “collateral consequence” is broad. Immigration 
came up most often, but housing and employment consequences also featured 
prominently in these interviews. There were other consequences that lawyers raised 
as well: loss or restriction of a driver’s license, sex-offender registration, and 
probation and parole consequences. Interviewees considered giving someone a 
criminal record for the first time a collateral consequence.98 This is especially true 
since a criminal record might create all manner of collateral consequences down the 
road, including making it more difficult to negotiate in any future criminal cases.99 
As one public defender noted, the “stigma” of a client having a record is a collateral 
consequence that they worry about every day in practice.100 
Which consequences matter in a particular case is client-specific. The goal of the 
plea bargain depends on the client.101 While many clients want the lowest sentence 
or least serious charge possible, others want something outside the scope of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
REV. 9, 28, 37 (2007) (noting that on felony charges, prosecutors tend to avoid offering mis-
demeanors, seeing a misdemeanor offer, instead, as a “last resort”). Since misdemeanor 
caseloads tend to be much higher, in this sense the strategies of lawyers who carry large 
misdemeanor caseloads tell us more about creativity in plea bargaining than those of lawyers 
who handle more serious felony cases.  
I also did not focus on private defense attorneys, as they only represent 17.6% of felony 
defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in the US. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov 
/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEM5-6H8T] (noting also that in U.S. district 
courts, private attorneys represent 33.4% of felony and 18.7% of misdemeanor defendants); 
see also Hannah Levintova, Jaeah Lee & Brett Brownell, Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble 
if You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 13, 2013, 6:00 AM),  
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts 
[https://perma.cc/ES57-BC4Y]. Exploring how private defense attorneys differ from public 
defenders in their thinking about plea bargaining and collateral consequences would be a 
fascinating avenue of exploration for further research but is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 96. For an example of the benefits of survey work in getting to questions of attorney prac-
tice, see generally Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery 
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 285 (2016). 
 97. SILBEY, supra note 84, at 287 (quoting PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT: WHY WOMEN 
REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME 243 (2007)).  
 98. Interview 8. 
 99. Interview 7; Interview 8. 
 100. Interview 8.  
 101. Interview 1; Interview 20.  
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criminal case—staying in the country (legally or not), keeping a job or Section 8 
housing, or maintaining a student loan so they can stay in school. Figuring out what 
the client wants and how to achieve that goal is a large part of the role of the public 
defender. And meeting that goal takes a fair amount of elbow grease and ingenuity.  
The data demonstrates the ways in which public defenders view their jobs as a 
creative enterprise that often revolves around the plea bargain. Lawyering has always 
been a creative field,102 but much of the focus on creativity in criminal law has been 
on the dashing trial lawyer, whose imaginative and inspired performance in a 
courtroom wins the day. New conceptions of creativity are emerging that focus 
instead on problem solving, particularly the ability to generate multiple solutions to 
a problem.103 These interviews paint a picture of public defense that involves defend-
ers using limited resources in innovative ways and expanding the bucket of options 
that are available to their clients.  
A. Plea Bargain Strategies  
Lawyers usually identify collateral consequences early in the process, at a client 
interview post-arrest. In many ways, this identification takes the form of a law school 
issue-spotting exam. A lawyer gets basic facts about the client’s life and the charges 
against him and begins to identify potential issues.104 Sometimes the client shares 
specific concerns right away.105 For the most part, the lawyer is on a hunt for those 
major collateral consequences that are relevant to the client’s life. Is the client in 
public housing? Or currently paying for college with loans? Does the client have a 
specific type of government job, which she will lose with a criminal conviction? And, 
of course, is the client a citizen?106  
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See generally Samantha A. Moppett, Lawyering Outside the Box: Confronting the 
Creativity Crisis, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 253, 263–74 (2013) (discussing the creative aspects of legal 
practice). It is also of note how many famous artists, writers, and musicians have legal training, 
or worked in legal practice. Cézanne, Handel, and Flaubert all studied law before pursuing 
their art full time. Matisse finished law school, passed the bar, worked as a court administrator 
and as a law clerk. Tchaikovsky studied law and music and worked as a government legal 
clerk. Robert Louis Stevenson graduated law school and was admitted to the bar in Scotland. 
Wassily Kandinsky, one of the founders of abstract expressionism, studied law at the 
University of Moscow and even taught as a professor at the university in the 1890s until he 
took up painting in his 30s. See generally DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, UNLIKELY MUSE: LEGAL 
THINKING AND ARTISTIC IMAGINATION 183 (2010). 
 103. See generally Moppett, supra note 102, at 263–74 (giving a broad picture of the field 
of creativity and discussing the facets of creativity).  
 104. Interview 1 (noting that they “look for flags” and that sometimes you get a “red flag,” 
like the client is a teacher or a security guard).  
 105. Interview 20 (noting that clients are often aware of their own specific situations and 
bring up areas of concern early). 
 106. Although I do not discuss it here, there are naturally issues with clients sharing all 
relevant information with their attorneys. Clients may not trust their attorneys or may not be 
able to identify relevant information that needs to be shared with the attorney. See generally 
Johnson, supra note 94, at 25–27. 
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Some offices provide a checklist that allows attorneys to go through the major 
areas of concern.107 These checklists make sure that the attorney asks some very basic 
questions of their clients. Not all attorneys use the checklist faithfully, finding that 
they have developed a rhythm for these early interviews.108 But the development of 
such checklists indicates that public defender offices are aware that there are certain 
key collateral consequences that are relevant to many clients and should be on the 
public defender’s radar.  
Almost all public defenders reported that they begin the interview with an early 
question intended to get at the client’s immigration status. The most common form 
of the question is, where were you born?109 Other questions follow that continue to 
assess the client’s situation outside of the criminal case. Many defenders reported 
asking about probation or parole status, whether the client lives in public housing, or 
what the client does for work. Again, this questioning is facilitated by prepared 
office-wide checklists, a memorized set of questions, or, in the case of New York, a 
bail recommendation form that is filled out prior to arraignment by the Criminal 
Justice Agency.110 The result is that public defenders are taking a great deal of time 
reviewing personal information with a defendant before even turning to the arrest 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Interview 5; Interview 6; Interview 16; Interview 22. 
 108. Interview 5 (has a checklist, but uses their own questions); Interview 19 (no checklist 
but always begins interview with a series of questions that includes inquiries into the client’s 
work, marital status, number and type of dependents, and immigration status).  
 109. With fourteen public defenders indicating that “Where were you born?” is among the 
first questions they ask. Other defenders may also ask, “Are you a citizen of the United 
States?” Interview 19. These sorts of questions can be met with some resistance by the client. 
One public defender explained that these early questions can make a client suspicious and this 
means you have to explain why you are asking these questions. Interview 8.  
 110. N.Y.C. CRIMIAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2016), http://www 
.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module=reports&module_id=1577&doc_name=doc [https:// 
perma.cc/UYZ7-RACM]. To assist with bail decisions, the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) in 
New York City is tasked with interviewing each defendant who is processed through Central 
Booking after an on-line arrest (as opposed to those defendants who are given Desk 
Appearance Tickets to return at a later date). CJA is an offshoot of a pilot project by the Vera 
Institute of Justice. In order to facilitate bail decisions, CJA interviews defendants before they 
are brought before a judge and asked a series of questions that are supposed to be dispositive 
of their risk for not returning to court. These questions include the defendant’s address, who 
the defendant lives with, whether the defendant has a working telephone number, whether the 
defendant is employed, the employer’s address and contact, the defendant’s hours worked per 
week and salary, among other questions. Operation’s Pretrial Services and Special Programs, 
N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY (2016), http://www.nycja.org 
/operations-pretrial-services-and-special-programs/ [https://perma.cc/6F37-FJW6]. Whether 
the answers to these questions help determine the defendant’s flight risk is recently a matter 
of debate. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting 
-of-bail-into-a-science.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170228061439/https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html?_r=0] (highlighting a 
“big data” study by the Arnold Foundation that found that the only reliable indicators for 
whether a defendant flees are his prior criminal record and any prior warrants for not returning 
to court). The benefit, however, of this prescreening is that many of these questions also help 
public defenders identify key areas of trouble for the client down the road.  
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charge and the factual and legal issues they need to develop for investigation and 
litigation of the case. 
For most public defenders, identifying the major collateral consequences has 
become rote (this is not true for those unseen collateral consequences that are hidden 
from easy detection or will not come up until down the road for the client).111 At plea 
bargaining, mitigation of these collateral consequences often becomes a goal of the 
plea process. Over and over again, defenders defined the goal of a plea bargain, or 
their role more generally, as meeting the specific needs of their clients. Here are just 
some examples: 
We’re trying to resolve the case in a way that does least damage to our 
client’s life.112  
[My job is] to implement my client’s goals.113 
So much of the job ends up being helping the client get what it is that is 
most important to him or her.114 
I always ask my clients: What is your goal here? If your goal here is to 
say I didn’t do anything wrong and I want to prove that, then you want 
to go to trial. If your goal here is to, let’s say, preserve your job, then that 
might be finding the plea that best works with your job. If your goal here 
is preserve your driver’s license, then that might be a different plea. If 
your goal here is to preserve your immigration status that might be a 
different plea. So prioritize for me—what is your goal? And from there 
we can work on what works best for you.115 
[To plead effectively] a public defender . . . needs to know what your 
client’s objective is.116 
[I am trying to achieve] the best scenario for the client.117 
These varied client goals118 are most often met through the negotiation of a plea.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. One example of a consequence that was not apparent until after a plea was entered 
was brought to light in Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010), 
rev’d 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012). A teacher who paid a student to have sex with him was allowed 
to retire with his pension. Id. at 1091. He was also charged criminally and, on his lawyer’s 
advice, pleaded guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent assault, both misdemeanors, and 
was sentenced to three years’ probation. Id. Neither charge carried the requirement of sex-
offender registration, but after the plea was entered, the indecent assault conviction resulted in 
the automatic forfeiture of the defendant’s pension, his primary source of income. Id.  
 112. Interview 3. 
 113. Interview 18.  
 114. Interview 14. 
 115. Interview 15.  
 116. Interview 17.  
 117. Interview 25.  
 118. But see Interview 11 (the goal is “to get less jail”).  
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1. Negotiating for Higher Sentences or Charges  
During bargaining, the negotiation of the charge and sentence is certainly still 
very much a part of the process. But, more frequently, minimizing the sentence does 
not account for a variety of individualized client needs. Instead, the defender attempts 
to bargain “around” the collateral consequence, which may involve a trade for a 
higher sentence or higher charge if the defender can secure some alternatively 
favorable outcome for the client.  
For instance, one public defender described an example in which the defendant 
opted for fifteen months in jail—a much longer prison sentence than usual for the 
type of the case—to avoid sex offender registration.119  Less time or no time in prison 
would seem like the better option. Why have the client spend time in prison if there 
is an option for him or her not to? Looking at this plea on paper, though, tells us 
nothing about the intricate and individualized decision making that the public 
defender undertook to come to this conclusion. In fact, on paper, the plea 
—in light of the typical offer—looks deeply problematic. And there would be no way 
to understand the logic behind the plea without poring through the case with the 
public defender. 
This is the trouble with looking at plea bargains on the surface, especially in the 
age of collateral consequences. As many attorneys noted to me during our 
conversations, they are willing to give up quite a bit on both sentencing and charging 
in exchange for immigration-safe pleas. This means, for instance, piling on commu-
nity service for a crime that usually carries a sentence of “time served.” Or, perhaps, 
it means swapping in an immigration-safe charge and different form of punishment 
than the charge and sentence currently on the table. As one public defender in El 
Paso County, Colorado, noted, the key is to find a “different label [for the] exact 
same punishment.”120 
This is true not just of immigration, but of other consequences as well. Lawyers 
and their clients are often particularly concerned about avoiding sex offender 
registration, which can last twenty-five years or more and comes with a multitude of 
onerous requirements that makes it difficult to find housing and employment.121 A 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Interview 16. Ethically, the attorney would have to discuss this decision with the cli-
ent, particularly since the daily deprivations of jail are also a severe consequence. See e.g., 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1(a) (3d ed. 1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GQF-KJ4F] (“Defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship 
of trust and confidence with the accused . . . .”); id. Standard 4-5.2(a) (discussing the 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty or go to trial after a “full consultation with counsel”). The 
news coverage of the abuses at Riker’s Island in New York gives some sense of the horrors of 
jails. Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in 
Jail, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/nyregion 
/rikers-study-finds-prisoners-injured-by-employees.html [https://perma.cc/WUQ6-YSBF]. 
 120. Interview 20. 
 121. See Julie Bosman, Teenager’s Jailing Brings a Call To Fix Sex Offender Registries, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/us/teenagers-jailing-brings 
-a-call-to-fix-sex-offender-registries.html [https://perma.cc/BTY8-G2CZ] (“[T]he nearly 
800,000 people on registries in the United States go beyond adults who have sexually assaulted 
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New York attorney recalled a conversation with a client in which they discussed 
taking an additional year and a half in prison on an attempted murder charge to avoid 
the sex offender registration that came with the accompanying rape charge.122 The 
willingness to accept additional prison time becomes a powerful bargaining chip for 
public defenders.123  
Interestingly, sometimes bargaining around sentences works in the opposite way 
as well, when there is no escaping the collateral consequences of the conviction. A 
defender may, for instance, ask the district attorney for a ninety-day jail sentence, 
rather than the usual offer of six months, arguing that the client’s mandatory de-
portation at the end of sentence should earn the client some benefit in sentencing 
length.124  
2. “Sterilizing” the Record  
Where a plea cannot be negotiated down or around, sometimes defenders are left 
to “sterilize”125 the record as much as possible to avoid later consequences for the 
client, particularly at immigration hearings. In Washington and Colorado, judges are 
required to have the defendant provide a recitation of the facts at the time of the plea 
for all cases.126 Because key language may be used against the client at immigration 
proceedings, defense lawyers often try to scrub the record of any particularly 
damaging language or admissions, while still figuring out how to have the client 
admit to the crime at hand.127 For instance, a public defender in El Paso County told 
                                                                                                                 
 
other adults or minors.”); see also Kelsie Tregilgas, Comment, Sex Offender Treatment in the 
United States: The Current Climate and an Unexpected Opportunity for Change, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 729, 730–43, 749–50 (2010) (examining the harshness of sex offender restrictions and 
suggesting that legislators seize the need for state budget cuts to also cut back on overly 
restrictive registration regulations). 
 122. Interview 1; see also Interview 16 (“Sometimes I take harsher penalties in order to 
avoid collateral consequences like immigration or sex offense.”). But see Interview 17 (“I can 
think of only one case where I was successful at plea bargaining around a sex conviction. . . . 
For the most part, the case that has the potential to require someone to register . . .  those cases 
we end up holding out for trial . . . .”).  
 123. Although not always. A defender in El Paso County, Colorado, told me about a client 
who was willing to serve additional jail time to protect his immigration status. The district 
attorney, however, was not sympathetic and refused to strike a deal. Interview 23.  
 124. Interview 1  
 125. Interview 18.  
 126. For instance, WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2(d) provides that “[t]he court shall not 
enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the 
plea.” This factual basis must be put on the record at the time of the plea. 
 127. Interview 18. In her article, Eagly discusses this phenomenon from the other end. 
Eagly, supra note 16. In Maricopa County, Arizona, prosecutors have been trained by ICE 
officials to make sure that the factual record at trial is developed in such a way that there will 
be no issues deporting the defendant in a later immigration case. Id. at 1220–21. As she notes, 
“ICE teaches prosecutors about the technical immigration meaning of local criminal statutes” 
and advises attorneys on what the factual record must reflect in order to secure removal in a 
later immigration hearing. Id. The public defenders I spoke to did not seem to come across 
prosecutors who made these same types of demands. It is clear though that the “sterilization” 
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me that they were advised by the central immigration attorney for the office that, for 
immigration purposes, a noncitizen in deportation proceedings will not be 
automatically deportable for a conviction for a single marijuana offense for a single 
occasion of marijuana use.128 In trying to make sure the record reflected a single 
occasion of marijuana use, the defender described to me their efforts to have their 
client only stipulate to one-time marijuana use during the “factual basis” portion of 
the plea.129 Because the district attorney would not agree to this stipulation, the 
defender negotiated a plea to a different charge that would have the client only 
admitting to “inhaling toxic vapors” on the record.130 This was a safe plea for the 
client if he ended up in immigration proceedings down the road.131 
3. Pleading to a Different State of Mind or Criminal Act 
Many times, defenders attempt to figure out a way to plead to a different state of 
mind requirement or a differently defined criminal act. For instance, defenders will 
negotiate for a plea to a charge that involves a “reckless” rather than “intentional” 
state of mind. This can happen during the recitation of the factual record.132 It can 
also happen by picking a particular subsection in the criminal code and switching it 
for the charged subsection.133 Alternatively, a defender may choose to plead to a 
subsection of a crime that covers a different criminal act. For instance, as one public 
defender noted, since manufacture of a false ID is a deportable offense, they will 
often try to plead to possession of a false ID, which is not.134 In New York, individu-
als and their families can be excluded from public housing where one person on the 
lease is convicted of a drug charge.135 This can make even low-level marijuana 
                                                                                                                 
 
technique will not be effective in all jurisdictions.  
 128. Interview 20. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. As Brandon Garrett notes in Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1415, 1439–41 (2016), part of the problem with viewing guilty pleas as con-
fessions is precisely because there are collateral consequences tied to many convictions and a 
plea may not reflect the actual facts of a case but only the legal elements.  
 132. Interview 23.  
 133. Interview 18.  
 134. Interview 25. In addition, Altman, in her article Prosecuting Post-Padilla, notes that 
many of these techniques are specifically used by prosecutors and defenders to shape 
immigration-safe pleas. Altman, supra note 16, at 23. She outlines three major ways in which 
prosecutors might help achieve these pleas: (1) the prosecutor can make an offer under a 
different criminal statute that is of a similar nature but that will not trigger deportation; (2) the 
prosecutor can attach a certain sentence to the plea offer—for instance, offering 364 days 
rather than 365 days, which also triggers removal in certain circumstances; (3) the prosecutor 
can customize the language that will end up in court documents and on the record, so the 
defendant is protected in a later immigration hearing. Id. at 23–25. I discuss the role of 
prosecutors in the process later in the Article, see infra Part III.B.2, but note here that the limits 
of the creative plea bargain are shaped by the prosecutor on the other side of the aisle.  
 135. In New York State, a conviction for PL 221.10, “[c]riminal possession of marihuana 
in the fifth degree,” a B misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of three months in jail, N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008), makes an individual ineligible for New York City 
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charges extremely dangerous for defendants and so defenders will try to find either 
noncriminal charges for their clients to plead to or different charges for which they 
may not have been originally charged.136  
The pleas described above are examples of what can be described as “fictional 
pleas.” As in literature, the fictions created in courthouses during the plea phase are 
often the result of tremendous creativity. The authors of the fictitious plea tend to be 
the public defenders, who have to figure out the nuances of the law to carve out 
“safe” pleas for their clients.137  
4. The Importance of Trial Skills to Negotiation  
There are, of course, instances where pleading around the collateral consequences 
of a case is not possible.138 It is at this stage, when a “safe” plea is not possible, that 
public defenders have to assess how important the potential or certain collateral 
consequence is to the client.  
All defenders still receive trial skills training.139 Most first-year attorneys will be 
trained in effective cross-examination techniques, the best way to perform a closing 
argument, and how to select a jury. These skills remain critical. Some attorneys re-
port that they may go to trial in cases where collateral consequences, particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 
public housing for three years after completion of the sentence. Collateral Consequences 
Calculator—New York State, COLUM. L. SCH., http://calculator.law.columbia.edu/ (select 
“221.10 Criminal Possession of Marihuana in the fifth degree” from the menu on the left) (last 
updated May 10, 2012, 11:27 PM) [https://perma.cc/4236-9VDE]. PL 221.10 was the fifth 
most frequent charge at arraignments in New York City in 2014 with nearly 25,000 arrests in 
that year alone. LISA LINDSAY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 
31 (Justin Barry ed., 2015), http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal 
/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QCV-4ASD]. 
 136. Interview 25.  
 137. Prosecutors may often be partners in this creative endeavor and may in fact be re-
quired to engage in creative problem solving. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual has an exhaustive 
list of considerations related to charging and pleas. The Manual puts an emphasis on an 
openness to noncriminal alternatives where they are available. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-
27.250, http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https:// 
perma.cc/NQ76-S7W7] (“Non-Criminal Alternatives to Prosecution”). In addition, the ABA’s 
Prosecution Function Standards require prosecutors to consider noncriminal alternatives and 
to be familiar with social agencies that may assist the prosecutor in the evaluation of the case. 
These are advisory but are considered influential. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 119, Standard 
3-3.8 (“(a) The prosecutor should consider in appropriate cases the availability of noncriminal 
disposition, formal or informal, in deciding whether to press criminal charges which would 
otherwise be supported by probable cause; especially in the case of a first offender, the nature 
of the offense may warrant noncriminal disposition. (b) Prosecutors should be familiar with 
the resources of social agencies which can assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion from 
the criminal process.”). But for reasons I explain below, see infra Parts III.A & B, it is 
defenders who are generally juggling the most moving pieces during the plea phase.  
 138. Interview 19. 
 139. Very rarely, however, do they receive training in negotiation. In the first study of its 
kind, Jenny Roberts and Ronald Wright survey public defenders about their training for plea 
bargaining and find that most defenders are not trained in the art of negotiation. Jenny Roberts 
& Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445 (2016).  
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immigration consequences, are grave and no favorable plea is forthcoming.140 These 
tend to be cases that would otherwise plead out if there were no collateral 
consequences but instead are tried in the hope of an acquittal.141 This, of course, is a 
risky move and one that defense attorneys generally want to avoid. But it is also 
where trial skills come into play. As one attorney noted, the way to make trial a viable 
threat to your opponent is to be an attorney who can and will go to trial.142 That 
means having solid trial skills and being knowledgeable about the substantive and 
procedural law, particularly the rules of evidence, and not being afraid of a 
courtroom.  
B. The Boundaries of Pleading 
1. Pleading Down and Pleading Up: Misdemeanors and Felonies  
Whether or not a defender can plead “around” the consequences of the crime has 
a lot to do with the crime itself. All crimes are not, of course, equal. Felonies gener-
ally carry much heavier sentences than misdemeanors (although not always).143 
Defenders tend to be more preoccupied with the sentence when the potential sentence 
is long, even where the charge itself may result in any number of other consequences 
for the client. In addition, many attorneys noted that it is easier to plead away the 
collateral consequences on a misdemeanor than on a felony. Plea bargains are 
dependent on the level of the crime and it is clear that Justice Stevens’ call to plea 
bargain “creatively” is not an easy task on felony charges.  
This is not to say that there is not extensive plea bargaining that occurs in felony 
cases. As Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen have found, felonies often plead down 
in charge bargaining—the movement from higher to lower charges that occurs in 
plea bargaining.144 They found, however, that it can be difficult for a defendant to 
get a misdemeanor plea when the starting charge is a felony, since prosecutors see 
misdemeanor offers as “a least-preferred option, perhaps even . . . a last resort.”145 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Interview 23; Interview 25. But see Interview 10 (reporting that they have never gone 
to trial based on immigration issues).  
 141. Eagly also reports this phenomenon in Harris County, Texas, which has an “illegal-
alien-punishment model” of criminal justice. Eagly, supra note 16, at 1170. There, “noncitizen 
defendants who are not offered any accommodation in the bargaining process may be 
disproportionately inclined to take their cases to trial. Anecdotal evidence from Harris County 
suggests that noncitizens may indeed be rolling the dice with juries more often.” Id. at 1195.  
 142. See infra note 156. 
 143. A misdemeanor is generally an indictable offense that carries a maximum sentence of 
fines or imprisonment for a year or less, or carries only a local or county jail term. A felony, 
by contrast, carries a longer authorized prison terms.  The distinction lies in the punishment 
that may be imposed. A wobbler is a crime that may be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor 
and its character (felony or misdemeanor) shall be determined by the level of sentence 
imposed. See generally, J.D.H., Annotation, Character of Offense as a Felony as Affected by 
Discretion of Court or Jury as Regards Punishment, 95 A.L.R. 1115 (1935). 
 144. Wright & Engen, supra note 95. 
 145. Id. at 10. In addition, as Eagly found in her conversations with district attorneys in 
Los Angeles, “[w]hen the crime is more significant or the circumstances less compelling, a 
plea deviation is unlikely.” Eagly, supra note 16, at 1164 (discussing how LA County district 
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Additionally, “the deeper the felony options available, the less likely prosecutors are 
to agree to a misdemeanor outcome.”146 To make these findings explicit, Wright and 
Engen studied North Carolina and found that “88% of the assaults originally charged 
as Class C147 felonies moved to some less serious version of assault; the same was 
true for 75% of the original Class E assaults and 67% of the Class F assaults.”148 The 
structure of the criminal code and the policies of prosecutors’ offices, therefore, make 
it difficult to get a misdemeanor offer on a felony, although negotiating to another 
felony might be available.  
The reality, though, is that pleas to misdemeanors do not solve the issue of 
collateral consequences. In fact, misdemeanors carry profound consequences.149 
Traffic convictions, for instance, are the largest source of criminal alien removals 
over the last ten years.150 And the population of misdemeanor offenders is incredibly 
complex. The Center for Court Innovation recently conducted a study that found that 
misdemeanor defendants tend not to be young people getting in trouble for the first 
time, but rather adults who have cycled through the system before and have many 
other concurrent concerns apart from the criminal case.151 
                                                                                                                 
 
attorneys view plea bargaining).  
 146. Wright & Engen, supra note 95, at 10 (“Groups of crimes that offer deeper options to 
the negotiators (such as the many versions of assault) appear to produce more frequent charge 
movement. Conversely, crimes that present more shallow options (such as the relatively few 
statutory sections related to kidnapping) appear to produce fewer reductions in the original 
charges.”). 
 147. On a scale of A to E, a Class A felony is the most serious and a Class E felony is the 
least serious. See id. at 13. 
 148. Id. at 14. 
 149. See supra note 17.  See generally Natapoff, supra note 24; Roberts, supra note 92, at 
297–306.  
 150. Eagly, supra note 16, at 1218–19. Eagly obtained data from the Department of 
Homeland Security and determined that “the single largest source of the rise in criminal alien 
removals over the past decade is traffic convictions. . . . [T]he category of criminal aliens 
removed as a result of a traffic offense increased ten-fold over the past decade, accounting for 
nearly thirty percent of the overall rise in criminal alien removals.” Id. at 1218 (footnote 
omitted); see also Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor 
Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07 
/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html [https://perma.cc/4HUF-QDQ4]. 
It is also critical to note that many traffic violations and low-level misdemeanors do not carry 
a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court held in Scott v. Illinois that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies only to situations in which a jail sentence has actually 
been imposed. 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (differentiating actual imprisonment from “fines 
or the mere threat of imprisonment”). 
 151. Greg Berman, A Surprising Portrait of the Misdemeanor Criminal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
9, 2014, 6:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greg-berman-a-surprising-portrait-of 
-the-misdemeanor-criminal-1415574093 [https://perma.cc/92B8-59H7] (noting that the aver-
age age of defendants charged with misdemeanors in Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Bronx in 
New York City is thirty-five, that more than half have prior misdemeanor convictions and 
more than a third have felony convictions, and that the population also reported issues with 
unemployment, mental health issues, drug use, and abuse). 
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Significantly, this means that creative and effective lawyering at the misdemeanor 
level is much more important than courts, scholars, and advocates often assume. As 
Jenny Roberts notes, the 
primary focus of misdemeanor defenders, and the institutions that set 
standards for effective representation, should . . . be the high collateral 
costs of lower court convictions. In this light, standards for the type and 
quality of misdemeanor defense counsel assistance are critical and may 
be different from standards in serious felony cases.152  
The defenders I spoke to seemed to understand that the need to negotiate is no 
less pressing at the misdemeanor phase, but they found that the latitude for negotia-
tion is wider. These lawyers noted that much of their creative bargaining happened 
when they were younger attorneys, starting out with high misdemeanor caseloads.153 
It was at the misdemeanor level that they felt they could take more chances and get 
bigger concessions on the collateral consequences front. One public defender found 
that it was much more common for them to bring up immigration consequences with 
the district attorney—and for the district attorney to be receptive—in their 
misdemeanor practice.154  
Part of this freedom comes from the relatively lower jail sentences that 
accompany misdemeanors. A misdemeanor can carry up to one year in jail—not an 
insignificant amount of time. As we know from the recent attention to bail, even a 
small amount of time spent in jail can impact, for instance, a person’s ability to keep 
a job and housing.155 But the reality is that misdemeanors often do not result in jail 
time—or at least not much of it—and are often resolved through fines or su-
pervision.156 Shorter sentences and more jail alternatives provide some leeway in 
negotiation. As a public defender in Colorado Springs put it bluntly, a defendant 
should take two weeks in jail if it means he can work in the medical field and he 
wants to be a nurse. But if he has a felony and he wants to be a nurse, he may be out 
of luck.157 
With misdemeanors, it is also particularly important that public defenders be 
ready to go to trial. As one defender observed, a good misdemeanor attorney has to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. Roberts, supra note 92, at 302.  
 153. Interview 14 (noting that immigration issues come up frequently in misdemeanor 
practice, whereas they have not had immigration consequences affect the decision to take a 
felony plea).  
 154. Interview 23.  
 155. JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 32 (2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/L25Z-KQEJ]. 
 156. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. 
J. SOC. 351, 374 (2013).  
 157. Interview 18. 
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be willing to go to trial, and this is most important because of collateral conse-
quences.158 As in all cases, having the reputation of being a good trial attorney se-
cures better plea outcomes.159 
As Jenny Roberts argues, though, and as many of the defenders I spoke to 
acknowledged, “misdemeanors are the usual training ground for new attorneys.”160 
The problem is that the legal and practice matters at the misdemeanor level are often 
incredibly complex.161 In addition, misdemeanor courts are mills that churn out con-
victions. Because of the desire to achieve the fast resolution of cases—on the part of 
judges, prosecutors, court staff, and defense attorneys—guilty pleas are encouraged 
at the misdemeanor level early and often.162 And by putting new and inexperienced 
attorneys in this position, it sends the message that the consequences of 
misdemeanors are less critical.  
It is particularly critical that new and inexperienced defenders are supported, 
given the tremendous impact of misdemeanor convictions. Creative plea bargaining, 
which occurs most frequently in the world of misdemeanors, takes time, knowledge, 
and resources. An understanding of the plea-bargaining process on the ground is 
critical to support the reform that scholars like Roberts advocate.  
2. The Relationship with District Attorneys  
I have argued that public defenders are the architects of plea bargains, but their 
craft occurs in a cooperative environment. This is not to say that lawyers always 
cooperate in harmony with other players in the system. But the reality of public de-
fense is interaction with others—with  clients, for one, but also with judges163 and 
district attorneys. The techniques for finding the right plea that I describe above are 
limited by the prosecutor—both by the formal and informal policies of the prose-
cutor’s office, and by the personality of the individual line prosecutor who has the 
case.164 Part of the plea process for defenders, then, is understanding both the local 
district attorney’s office and their individual adversary.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Interview 18. 
 159. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 160. Roberts, supra note 92, at 303.  
 161. Id. at 303–06 (noting that apart from collateral consequences, there are issues of 
suppression, expert testimony, Crawford/Confrontation Clause issues, and other constitutional 
issues that confront the average misdemeanor attorney in practice; these legal issues are on 
top of the other daily requirements of “interviewing and counseling the client, negotiating with 
the prosecution, and conducting factual investigation and legal research”). 
 162. Id. at 307–08 (noting, among other examples, a particularly troubling system in 
Broward County, Florida, where one courtroom was handing out forms to defendants “ex-
plaining how the fee for court-appointed attorneys was $50 for a plea entered at arraignment, 
and $350 for a plea after arraignment”). 
 163. My focus here is on the interaction between defenders and prosecutors, but judges 
play a role too in setting boundaries on the plea process, of course. In fact, since Padilla many 
public defenders I spoke to have found that judges have become more active in the plea phase 
of the trial. 
 164. This is the view of most of the public defenders I spoke to. As Jenny Roberts and 
Ronald Wright note in Training for Bargaining, though, the perception that the ability to ne-
gotiate is entirely defined by the parties is incorrect under negotiation theory. Roberts & 
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Darryl K. Brown predicted after Padilla that there would be limits on the use of 
plea bargaining to achieve optimal outcomes for noncitizen defendants because 
prosecutors do not have incentives to make good offers to noncitizens.165 This predic-
tion is borne out both in my research and in the work of other scholars who are 
focusing on how prosecutors envision their role post-Padilla.  
Ingrid Eagly studied how local government policy shapes the response to 
noncitizens in far-ranging and varied ways from state to state.166 She finds that 
prosecutors in certain jurisdictions are driven by what she calls an “alienage-neutral” 
model, in which “criminal justice actors endeavor to make decisions that limit the 
potential effects of immigration status and enforcement on criminal adjudication.”167 
In Los Angeles, for instance, prosecutors take into account immigration issues when 
deciding plea offers in low-level cases.168 They also take into account other collateral 
consequences, like the loss of a job or a professional license, for defendants in these 
cases.169 The Los Angeles model “weigh[s] collateral consequences on a ‘sort of 
sliding scale.’”170  
On the other end of the spectrum is Maricopa County, Arizona, which has an 
“immigration-enforcement” model.171 In Maricopa County, prosecutors consider 
immigration consequences as a means of enforcing federal immigration law.172 For 
instance, prosecutors will charge defendants in state court with crimes that qualify as 
aggravated felonies or crimes of moral turpitude under federal immigration law in 
order to increase the chances that the noncitizen defendant will be deported in a later 
immigration proceeding.173 
Heidi Altman has also given us a window into how prosecutors think about 
immigration consequences by surveying 185 district attorneys in Brooklyn, New 
                                                                                                                 
 
Wright, supra note 139, at 1466–69. In fact, if defenders were trained to negotiate, they may 
actually be able to achieve results with a range of prosecutors.  
 165. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1399–
1407 (2011). Brown argues that a number of factors make Padilla unlikely to change plea 
bargaining outcomes. Id. First, he contends that substantive criminal law and procedural 
structures make it difficult to craft bargains that would avoid deportation; that is, even if a 
prosecutor wanted to prevent immigration consequences, this might really be beyond her 
power. Id. Brown also argues that prosecutors generally lack incentives to bargain around 
deportation; Padilla’s directive focuses on defense counsel, and prosecutors might see value 
in deporting defendants rather than incarcerating them in state-funded prisons. Id.  
 166. Eagly, supra note 16, at 1126. 
 167. Id. at 1157.  
 168. Id. at 1163–64. In fact, as Eagly notes in a separate article, Los Angeles County has a 
written policy that “explicitly allow[s] prosecutors to consider the adverse immigration 
consequences of deportation in arriving at an appropriate case disposition.” Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 266 (2016). 
 169. Eagly, supra note 16, at 1164 (noting that collateral consequences do not come into 
play, however, when dealing with more serious crimes).  
 170. Id. (quoting an interview with a high-ranking prosecutor in the L.A. County District 
Attorney’s Office).  
 171. Id. at 1180. 
 172. Id. at 1180–81. 
 173. Id. at 1187–88. 
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York.174 She found that, although over half of the district attorneys surveyed believed 
that it was sometimes appropriate to modify a plea to mitigate negative immigration 
consequences, less than half actually did refashion pleas in practice for this 
purpose.175  
In my conversations with defenders, they revealed that effectively dealing with 
prosecutors was the most critical part of plea bargaining. This makes sense, as 
prosecutors hold much, if not all, of the power.176 It is prosecutors who make the 
decisions about how to charge crimes, and those charging decisions impact the 
boundaries of the negotiation.177 As a result, knowing the prosecutor can be just as 
important as knowing the law.  
Defenders reported that prosecutors are not equally open to discussion on all 
collateral consequences. For many defenders, particularly those in Brooklyn, the 
Bronx, and Manhattan, discussion about immigration consequences with prosecutors 
is commonplace, even if that discussion does not lead to any positive results for the 
client.178 In Manhattan and the Bronx, for instance, most attorneys felt comfortable 
generally discussing immigration consequences with most prosecutors.179 However, 
one defender in Manhattan noted that attempts to convince prosecutors that Padilla 
created affirmative duties for them to bargain around immigration consequences had 
mostly fallen on deaf ears.180 In Brooklyn, the defenders I interviewed indicated that 
district attorneys generally go out of their way to reach immigration-friendly 
resolutions.181  
The defenders I interviewed in Washington and Colorado were less likely to 
discuss immigration consequences openly with prosecutors, instead figuring out 
ways to get prosecutors to agree to alternative pleas without explaining why they 
were seeking such pleas. As one defender noted, they would never want information 
on a client’s status to get into “the wrong hands,” and for that reason there is a real 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. Altman, supra note 16, at 28. 
 175. Id. at 29. 
 176. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 177. Judges also have a role to play. In jurisdictions with indeterminate sentencing, a judge 
may accept a plea to the top charge and then sentence the defendant to the lowest sentence 
within the range if he or she chooses.  
 178. Interview 6 (noting that district attorneys can be receptive to immigration conse-
quences when the crime is not serious but that in general district attorneys in Manhattan are 
not generous in this regard). 
 179. Interview 4; Interview 21.  
 180. Interview 1. 
 181. For example, one defender described a case in which the prosecutor worked with the 
defender to reach five separate immigration-safe pleas for one client, who was facing multiple 
charges. Interview 14. This perception by defenders in Brooklyn is particularly interesting 
given Altman’s findings that less than half of the Brooklyn district attorneys she surveyed 
report making offers based on the risk of these penalties. Altman, supra note 16, at 29. In their 
piece on pre-plea discovery, Jenia Turner and Allison Redlich also find that there is sometimes 
a mismatch between prosecutor and defense attorney perception on the same issue, which in 
their study was the definition of “exculpatory evidence.” Jenia I. Turner and Allison D. 
Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 333 (2016).  
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hesitation to ever share this information with district attorneys.182 A defender in 
Washington recounted a case in which a local district attorney reported one of the 
defender’s clients to ICE, resulting in his in-court arrest by the federal agency.183 
This was despite the fact that most district attorneys in the county are, according to 
the defender, “liberal” and open to discussing immigration and other consequences 
in plea negotiations.184 It was particularly important to many defenders that 
information about immigration consequences never make it onto the formal 
record.185  
When it came to other collateral consequences, defenders typically reported that 
district attorneys did not care much about housing, employment, sex offender reg-
istration, probation and parole,186 and other consequences facing their clients. In fact, 
many defenders expressed a particular concern with what they viewed as the hard-
heartedness of district attorneys when dealing with clients.187 One public defender 
noted that it can be shocking how unsympathetic DAs are to collateral con-
sequences.188 This was a sentiment that was expressed repeatedly by defenders across 
the survey.189 Many public defenders throughout the sample also reported a belief 
that prosecutors do not get as much training on collateral consequences, even 
immigration consequences, and therefore do not recognize them nearly as well as 
defenders or understand how they can affect the lives of defendants.190 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. Interview 19; accord Interview 24 (noting that they encountered DAs who want to 
punish defendants more because they are undocumented and others who are sympathetic in 
the same situation). 
 183. Interview 18. 
 184. Id.   
 185. E.g., Interview 3; Interview 19; Interview 20.  
 186. Interview 4. 
 187. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is critical to note that defenders feel 
under attack by many players in the system, particularly prosecutors and judges, and that can 
impact their ability to negotiate effectively. As one defender put it, you have to be “okay with 
people hating you . . . our judges hate us, a lot of our clients hate us, the prosecutors definitely 
hate us.” Interview 23. There may be a problematic overlay about what this sort of hostility 
does to the balance of power in the negotiation. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania 
found that anxious negotiators “had lower expectations, made lower first offers, responded 
more quickly to offers and exited the bargaining sooner,” resulting in worse outcomes. Alison 
Wood Brooks & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Can Nervous Nelly Negotiate? How Anxiety Causes 
Negotiators To Make Low First Offers, Exit Early, and Earn Less Profit, 115 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 43, 47 (2011). Furthermore, feelings 
of negativity about the job, might impact the defender’s ability to be creative, which is critical 
to negotiation. Kimberlyn Leary, Julianna Pillemer & Michael Wheeler, Negotiating with 
Emotion, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 96, 101.  
 188. Interview 19. 
 189. Interview 9 (noting that district attorneys tend not to understand the immigrant experi-
ence and that “they don’t understand what it’s like to be on a probationary period at a job”); 
Interview 8 (district attorneys tend to come straight through from college and are therefore 
“sheltered”). 
 190. Interview 14; Interview 9 (“What training are they getting? It seems counter to the 
training we’re getting.”).  
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Some defenders, though, noted particular success with using the loss or 
suspension of a driver’s license in negotiations. This was more often true in the areas 
where people have to drive to get to work (Colorado191 and Washington) than where 
they generally do not (New York and Boston). This ability to negotiate around 
license suspension is partly due to the range of sentencing options available in most 
driving cases. Many defenders noted the ability to plead to a particular section of a 
driving offense that allowed them to get a shorter license suspension or a deferred 
sentence that would eliminate the suspension.192  
The most common thread, though, seemed to be the lack of uniformity in 
experiences with the members of the county district attorney’s office. Whether a 
defender will bring up immigration and other collateral consequences is incredibly 
dependent on the specific prosecutor rather than on any policy articulated by the 
county office.193 Therefore, a surprisingly large part of the job of a defender is deeply 
understanding the adversary. That includes appreciating what type of consequences 
the adversary will be open to discussing. Many defenders talked about the creativity 
and work that went into leading district attorneys to the right plea.194 Others discussed 
how critical it is to make the district attorneys care about this one defendant, often 
out of the hundreds before them.195 In New York, a defender explained that one of 
the most important traits of a public defender is creativity because “you are asking 
the same district attorney to make an exception five times a week.”196 They 
continued, “How to make people special to the government is the challenge.”197 
There are other ways that defenders attempt to get what they want out of district 
attorneys. Here is just one example of all the ways that a public defender in the Bronx 
achieves results:  
I mean I will use definitely a wide variety of tools. Like it depends on 
the situation. Usually, I start off being kind of mean to the prosecutor 
because usually the ones who are calling me to negotiate are like the baby 
DAs198 who don’t know that you don’t really need to do that or whatever. 
So sometimes I’m kind of more of a bully to them. Sometime I’m much 
nicer, if it’s like a tougher case, so [ ] more delicate. And there sort of 
have been times when I have thrown my client under the bus to the DA 
to try to get them that offer. And there’s other times when I’ve just 
developed a good relationship with the DA and so I joke around with 
them and [ ] suck up to them or whatever and over time they give me 
better offers. So there’s a lot of that ego-stroking type stuff. And you 
know, sometimes . . . I guilt them . . . like with a client’s sob story . . . . I 
think there’ve probably even been times where I’ve like brought up 
another case where maybe I felt like they got the upper hand in the end 
and try to like guilt them that way. Because, you know, we’re repeat 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. Interview 19 (DAs “much more open” to negotiating around licensing issues).  
 192. Id.  
 193. E.g., Interview 10; Interview 16; Interview 17; Interview 19; Interview 24.  
 194. Interview 20.  
 195. Interview 17.  
 196. Interview 1. 
 197. Id.  
 198.  “Baby DAs” refers to junior district attorneys. 
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players. So I mean there certainly . . . things I will not stoop to, but [ ] I 
will do a lot of these other things.  . . . Obviously . . . investigating a case 
and [ ] telling them . . . or implying that [ ] they’re not going to be able 
to prove it at trial, or talk to their witnesses and digging up dirt on them. 
Usually, that type of dirt on the complainant I won’t reveal—except in 
the vaguest of ways—to get a plea because I don’t like to tip my hand 
that much with that. And then like legal issues . . . like sometimes I’ll 
make like hay out of a nothing-nothing stupid legal issue, you know, just 
to try to get them to be scared into . . . like they’re going to lose on a 
suppression issue or whatever issue. Or paper them to death.199 
Although it is clear that prosecutors still have the upper hand in plea bargaining, there 
are many ways in which defenders incorporate creative measures into the process to 
achieve results for their clients.  
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES ON PUBLIC DEFENSE  
These findings have broad implications for how to think about public defense 
going forward. I argue that there are three main lessons to draw from these inter-
views. First, attempts to measure public defender performance are limited by the 
unavailability of data that accounts for all the factors that go into the plea decision. 
Evaluation and accountability by offices and individual defenders are critical. But 
how we evaluate public defenders, particularly young defenders, must account for 
how they negotiate around the collateral consequences that their clients prioritize. 
Second, determining prevailing professional norms under the ineffective assistance 
of counsel inquiry is a complicated task in an age of collateral consequences. De-
fenders may pursue different goals and different strategies in similar cases. The 
deeply contextual nature of lawyering makes it more difficult for courts to answer 
the question, what is a good lawyer? Finally, this work also serves as a renewed call 
for state and local governments to fund holistic public defense. Public defenders 
should be given sufficient resources to make sure they are prepared to deal with the 
varied collateral consequences that come up in practice. We now know that public 
defenders are the front line, not only for the criminal case, but for so much that flows 
from the criminal case. And improving the way that public defenders advise and 
negotiate around collateral consequences should be a priority for criminal justice 
reform.  
A. Public Defense and the Trouble with Measuring Outcomes 
To assess public defenders, we must evaluate the success of the plea bargain. In 
doing so, however, we have to define the meaning of success. The definition of 
success should involve not only the negotiation of the sentence and charge but also 
the negotiation of any collateral consequences that the client prioritizes. These client 
needs, however, can be difficult concepts to quantify, as are the lawyering skills that 
are needed to identify and meet these needs. As a result, as we move towards 
incorporating data collection and analysis tools in public defender office evaluations, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. Interview 21. 
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we need to understand the complexity of the plea negotiation. I echo the call by 
Metzger and Ferguson and others for defender offices to begin collecting data. Part 
of the challenge is determining the goal of data collection.200 If the goal of collecting 
data is to evaluate the individual defender, then all their work must be captured. 
There are, however, barriers to that collection.  
Much of what happens in plea bargaining will never be formally recorded,201 
especially sensitive information on immigration status. As Metzger and Ferguson 
point out, many defenders would have legitimate concerns about memorializing a 
client’s immigration status in a computer system, particularly for the use of wide-
scale collection and analysis.202 Even less sensitive information about the client 
—for example, a strong desire to hold on to a job—may be kept close to the vest 
during negotiations but have an impact on the defender’s actions and ultimate out-
comes. These sorts of facts may be brought up in off-the-record conversations be-
tween the defense attorney and the prosecutor, but more likely than not, they remain 
in the private files of the defense attorney. These limitations must be acknowledged 
when measuring public defender effectiveness at securing outcomes. 
In addition, even when these particular factors, such as immigration status, can be 
accounted for, there are still questions as to what is the best outcome for any in-
dividual client. Perhaps the client wants to get out of jail at any cost, even if it means 
risking his ability to remain in the country. His goal may be a shorter sentence, rather 
than protecting his status in the country, and he is therefore willing to take a plea that 
is unsafe for his immigration status. The very next client may make the opposite 
decision. 203 As one public defender put it, “I don’t always like my client’s math”204—
referring to the client’s decision to get out of jail when a better offer may be shortly 
forthcoming—but they still have to accept the client’s calculation. Defenders are 
playing a card game during these negotiations in which they show some of their cards 
but not others. But all of the cards matter in determining whether a defender is 
performing effectively. Whether a sentence or charge is reduced will not always tell 
us whether the defender has played his cards well. 
Another barrier is the ethos of public defenders themselves. As Ferguson and 
Metzger point out, there are also problems with getting underfunded, overworked, 
and notoriously anti-authoritarian public defenders to collect data on their cases and 
clients.205 In the few states that have tried to gather data on public defenders, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. If the goal is to offer a summary report of the work of the institution of the public 
defender, then the data now publicly available may be sufficient to understand a basic picture 
of what the public defender achieves. 
 201. It is not easy to find data about criminal court matters in the first place. Metzger & 
Ferguson, supra note 64, at 1076; Wright & Peeples, supra note 59, at 1232 (noting the issues 
with collecting data in a world in which courthouses often keep outdated computer systems 
and where much of the data is recorded only by hand). 
 202. Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 64, at 1103. 
 203. Much of what happens at the plea phase also depends on the prosecutor on the other 
side of the negotiation. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 204. Interview 1. 
 205. Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 64, at 1077–78; Robin Steinberg & David Feige, 
Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 123, 132 (2004) (noting the anti-authoritarian bent of public defenders and the 
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researchers reported that public defenders have been resistant to such efforts.206 
Much of this collection will have to be done internally within defender offices 
because they have access to many data points about a case that the outside world 
does not.207 This means that case management systems will have to allow for the 
collection of an array of variables that went into the plea. Understanding the imper-
ative to collect internal data, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association has 
already made a push to encourage local offices to begin collecting and organizing 
data.208 But their list of potentially collectible data does not include information about 
collateral consequences. Without this information, critical data about the plea process 
will be missing.  
This is not to say, of course, that we should abandon efforts at data collection and 
analysis. Meaningful evaluation is missing in many defender offices.209 The result 
can be that many public defenders who are performing poorly, sometimes dra-
matically so, can fall through the cracks.210 Even well-meaning defenders can and do 
perform inadequately.211 Evaluation is an essential check on this behavior. Public 
                                                                                                                 
 
difficulties that this personality type raises for supervisors in public defender offices). 
 206. Laurin, supra note 57, at 360.  
 207. There have, though, been calls for federal court monitors to oversee the work of failing 
public defender offices. In cases like this, the internal documents of the office would likely be 
open to outside reviewers. In 2013, the Justice Department called for federal oversight of two 
cities’ public defender organizations in Washington State. Mike Carter, Judge: Mt. Vernon, 
Burlington Failing Poor Defendants, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013, 11:46 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/judge-mt-vernon-burlington-failing-poor-defendants 
[https://perma.cc/R6BA-D2PJ]. Judge Lasnik of the Western District of Washington required 
the cities of Burlington and Mount Vernon to hire an independent supervisor to monitor their 
public defense system. Id.  
 208. See supra note 67. 
 209. MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARYL V. ATKINSON, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. 
SERVS., THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT DEFENSE: NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEMS 
EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDES 1 (2012), http://www.ncids.org 
/systems%20evaluation%20project/performancemeasures/PM_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G4J 
-DH7D] (noting that many defender organizations lack a structured evaluation system). 
 210. A lawsuit in Washington State alleged that the cities of Mt. Vernon and Burlington 
extended contracts with the two attorneys handling indigent defense in those cities, despite 
numerous complaints that the attorneys did not meet with clients or investigate the charges 
against them, did not stand with and represent them in court, and did not explain the cases 
against them or their options or respond to client communications. Wilbur v. City of Mount 
Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013). According to the ACLU, which 
represented the plaintiffs, city officials had received complaints regarding this breakdown in 
indigent defense not only from the Office of Assigned Counsel but also from police officers 
who could not contact public defenders. See Lawsuit Can Go Forward Challenging Shockingly 
Deficient Public Defense System, AM. C.L. UNION WASH. (Feb. 23. 2012), https:// 
aclu-wa.org/news/lawsuit-can-go-forward-challenging-shockingly-deficient-public-defense-system 
[https://perma.cc/LJ49-L64K]. Plaintiffs claimed the cities failed to monitor the two attorneys 
contracted to handle indigent defense cases, failed to adequately fund the indigent defense 
system, and failed to impose a caseload limit. Id. In 2010, these two attorneys handled more 
than 2100 misdemeanor cases. Id. 
 211. As Tigran Eldred has noted, public defenders can often suffer from “ethical blind-
ness,” in which the caseload pressures and other challenges of the job allow even very well-
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defenders are already evaluated in certain respects—for instance, with a periodic 
review of their case files or with a supervisor who observes them during a trial212 
—but a systemized mechanism for wide-scale and uniform evaluation is mostly 
missing from the profession.213  
Partly this lack of evaluation is a result of preserving the air of mystery that 
surrounds just the sort of creativity that goes into plea bargaining. As Jenny Roberts 
points out, courts avoid defining the responsibilities of defense counsel at plea 
bargaining because of the commonly held belief that lawyering—at plea bargaining 
and at trial—is an “art.”214 As the Supreme Court notes in Frye, “‘[t]he art of 
negotiation is at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy . . . .’ [Plea bargaining 
is] defined in substantial degree by personal style.”215 But, as Roberts argues, courts 
and attorneys should not forgo setting professional standards for defenders because 
negotiation may rely on personal style and soft skills.216 Similarly, we should not 
forgo evaluation. Rather, we must acknowledge the factors that go into creative plea 
bargaining and be sure to account for them.  
This involves clearly defining the measure of success and then collecting data 
accordingly. If we evaluate the success of a plea based on the length of sentence, the 
risk is that public defenders who are achieving results for their clients in areas outside 
of the sentence will appear to be performing poorly. Because the measure of a public 
defender, particularly a young defender, is their ability to negotiate, and because 
much of the information that underlies those negotiations is enclosed in the 
confidential file, there must be efforts to create a more robust data set to use for 
assessment.  
As Ronald Wright and Ralph Peeples note in their piece Criminal Defense Lawyer 
Moneyball, there are ways in which defender offices can cull their own internal data 
set to evaluate and rank defenders in their offices.217 While Wright and Peeples favor 
a “quality metric,”218 which focuses on the sentence reduction that the attorney 
achieves, they note that a defender office may choose to rate attorney success based 
                                                                                                                 
 
meaning public defenders to convince themselves that they are performing to a certain level 
of quality when they are not. Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving 
Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 368–74 
(2013). 
 212. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN 
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002), http://www.americanbar.org 
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet 
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D42-RSVU]; see also NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES Guideline 5.4 (1976). 
I would also argue that no matter what form evaluation takes, feedback and discussion with 
supervisors and senior attorneys should always be incorporated into the professional 
evaluations of defenders as it is essential to legal education, particularly for young attorneys.  
 213. Wright & Peeples, supra note 59, at 1230.  
 214. Roberts, supra note 55, at 2669–73. 
 215. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (quoting Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 
115, 125 (2011)). 
 216. Roberts, supra note 55, at 2671–72. 
 217. Wright & Peeples, supra note 59, at 1223.  
 218. Id. at 1242 (“Such a measure focuses on an outcome that matters to the defendants, 
and one that captures the negotiation skills that are central to modern criminal practice.”). 
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on “the reduction of ‘embedded consequences’ like immigration removal or loss of 
public housing.”219 I argue that, indeed, these offices must include information on 
collateral consequences if they want to evaluate the success of their defenders. 
Because collateral consequences have become so intimately tied with the decisions 
that defenders make in the field, they have become part of role of the public defender. 
The natural counterargument here is that the job of a defense attorney is not to 
achieve results on collateral consequences; it is to achieve results on the criminal 
case. Lawyers are not social workers and they should not be evaluated on whether 
they make sure the client stays in school or keeps his children. But the reality is that, 
for better or for worse, the criminal system has shifted public defenders into this role. 
As Alexandra Natapoff explains, “Public defenders have long grappled with the non-
criminal needs of their clients. They find them drug treatment programs, bus tokens, 
and clothing for job interviews. They develop relationships with them, their families, 
and their children.”220 It may not be in the “written” job description, but there is much 
beyond the criminal case that has become part of the job. Public defenders are the 
front line of many client crises.  
A turn to data review should not wash away the significance of the creative nature 
of the job. There is no one way to reach an outcome. Much of the process and end 
result will depend on the needs of the individual client, the personality of the 
prosecutor, and the judge sitting in the courtroom on the day of the plea—to say 
nothing of the characteristics of the defender herself. A creative and savvy public 
defender can account for these moving pieces, and evaluation should account for the 
skill that is required to see the whole board and maneuver accordingly.  
This is not to overstate the skills of defenders or romanticize the position. Rather 
it is a reminder that creativity is part of what makes a defense attorney successful. 
And much of what is happening in the modern courtroom is creative work. Lawyers 
are not artists; they have clients and are expected to achieve results. But to get to 
those results, they use significant imagination and invention.  
B. Changing Professional Norms and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The purpose of my inquiry here is not to answer the question of whether defenders 
are or are not pleading effectively under the Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence. Instead, I describe the ways in which defenders attempt to be effective 
in their jobs, given the pressures of collateral consequences, and I explore the ways 
in which this type of work will not be picked up by the typical measures of 
effectiveness now employed by courts and scholars.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. Id. at 1250–51. Statistics may also shed light on what L. Song Richardson and Phillip 
Goff warn is implicit bias in the prioritizing of cases by public defenders. Data has the potential 
to illuminate a glaring issue that is hiding in plain sight. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba 
Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (arguing that 
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 220. Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 445, 459 (2015).  
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But these findings have implications for how we think about ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims and the definition of a “good lawyer.”221 The Court indicates in 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye that it understands that part of the definition has to include 
how lawyers advise clients at the plea phase. Lower courts have extended this duty 
to advise to other collateral consequences that are severe and clear at the time of the 
plea. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit granted relief to a defendant who was not 
advised by his lawyer that his plea carried the possibility of civil commitment as a 
sexually violent predator.222 Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a 
lawyer had a duty to advise his client that his plea required sex-offender 
registration.223 
Interestingly, Padilla actually rested on the premise that lawyers were already 
advising their clients about the potential for deportation.224 Justice Stevens presumed 
that very little would change, since the decision only formalized what was already 
attorney practice.225 For the most part, though, the defenders I spoke to saw Padilla 
as a sea change.226 Even though some defenders reported that it has always been their 
practice to advise clients as to the immigration consequences of a plea, many saw 
Padilla as forcing their offices to make official what had been a largely informal 
process. In this sense, Padilla allowed defender organizations to throw themselves 
more fully into the project of mitigating collateral consequences. According to my 
interviews, Padilla created a sense among public defenders that they had new 
obligations to their clients. Proof of this shifting mindset can be found in the new 
training and resources that began to be diverted to immigration consequences after 
Padilla. As I describe in greater detail below, many defender offices required all 
attorneys to undergo intensive trainings about immigration and local and state 
defender offices began to hire immigration specialists.227 
It was also clear in my interviews that these defenders see their Padilla obligations 
as expanding beyond the scope of Justice Stevens’s directive to only give specific 
advice where the law is clear and generalized advice otherwise.228 Nearly all public 
defenders I spoke to said that they would not advise a client that there might be 
immigration consequences to their conviction, without specifying those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. For the purposes of this section, I will focus on the “prevailing professional norms” 
prong of Strickland. For a thorough explanation of the “prejudice” prong after Padilla, see 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 4:8 (2013). 
 222. Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 223. People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 896 (Mich. App. 2011); see also Taylor v. State, 
698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that Padilla required counsel to advise about 
sex offender registration requirements).  
 224. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). 
 225. Id. Although, as Justice Alito noted, the assumption was grounded in the aspirations 
laid out by the relevant professional standards and not any empirical work about real practice. 
Id. at 377 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 226. Except in Colorado, which, under People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987), was 
one of the few states that already required attorneys to advise their clients about immigration 
consequences prior to Padilla.  
 227. See infra Part IV.C. 
 228. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
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consequences.229 Most of them also give follow-up advice that includes explaining 
to the client their potential grounds for relief if they are convicted of the crime.  
But not everyone sees their duties so broadly, and for good reason. Many 
defenders told me that they are not immigration lawyers, just as they are not landlord-
tenant or employment attorneys, and they express this to their clients.230 Other 
defenders made clear that getting the lowest sentence is still the most important part 
of their job and that it trumps concerns about collateral consequences.231 
This disagreement among defenders about the appropriate goal for the plea 
bargain is why determining prevailing professional norms is so thorny. Embedded in 
these post-Padilla cases about advice is a question about the nature of plea bar-
gaining. When courts say that an attorney should have advised his client that he was 
going to face civil commitment as a sexually violent predator, they are also saying 
that the attorney should have attempted to achieve a different outcome—one in which 
he would not face the collateral consequence. In this way, creative plea bargaining is 
already very much a part of how courts view lawyering after Padilla, although it is 
not explicitly stated.  
The issue with this view is that there remains a range of what a lawyer may be 
trying to achieve at plea bargaining, as well as his ability to achieve it.232 One de-
fender may pursue the lowest possible sentence, while another in the same position 
might focus on mitigating collateral consequences. Both strategies could be the 
thoughtful product of an effective defender or the only option available to that de-
fender given the circumstances. As ineffective assistance jurisprudence develops in 
the wake of Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, courts and lawyers will have to grapple with 
the deeply contextual nature of lawyering in the era of collateral consequences. 
Although this Article identifies emerging trends in practice, what constitutes “pre-
vailing professional norms” at plea bargaining is a complicated matter that will not 
be resolved by an expansion of defense counsel’s duty to advise. Just as the definition 
of a “good plea” now has a range of meanings, so too does the definition of a “good 
lawyer.” As a result, prevailing professional norms become more difficult to pin 
down.  
But given the impact that Padilla has had on the practice of lawyering and 
therefore the shaping of these norms, it is worth it for courts to express that good 
lawyering includes bargaining creatively around collateral consequences. Such ex-
pressions strengthen the work that many defenders are already doing and put pressure 
on defender organizations and the local governments that fund them to focus 
attention on these issues. In this way, the court has a role to play in instituting 
reform—both directly and indirectly. The power of Padilla was both the formal 
holding that lawyers must advise their clients about immigration consequences and 
the acknowledgment that creative bargaining was part of the process of pleading 
around collateral consequences. While there is no one “right” goal for plea bar-
gaining, courts should go further in making clear that good defense lawyering should 
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(and often already does) take into account a broad range of collateral consequences 
that may be important to the individual defendant.  
C. A Renewed Call for Holistic Defense  
These expanded obligations for defense counsel after Padilla run up against the 
reality of practice. It is clear that getting a good lawyer is critical to defendants in 
criminal court. But it is equally clear that public defenders often struggle to meet the 
needs of all of their clients. Deep work on one case to determine the relevant 
consequences and how to avoid them often means less work on another case. There 
are many areas of suggested reform in the criminal justice system.233 I argue here that 
high on the list must be training and resources so that defenders can mitigate 
collateral consequences effectively. This means that defender offices should embrace 
the holistic model of defense. By holistic model, I mean a form of public defense 
made popular by the Bronx Defenders in New York City,234 where a team of attor-
neys and social workers collaborate to meet client needs.235 The Bronx Defenders, 
for instance, offers immediate services for their criminal clients on a range of issues 
beyond the criminal case. Although there have been calls for a move to a holistic 
paradigm for all public defender offices, most offices are still not offering holistic 
services.236  
As my research indicates, defenders already view themselves as serving a holistic 
role. The goal of the plea bargain, and of their representation more broadly, is often 
defined by the varied needs of the client, even where those needs stretch beyond the 
charge and sentence.237  
There is nothing novel about the call to train public defenders about collateral 
consequences and provide them better resources in this area.238 The holistic defense 
movement is premised on giving clients wraparound services that address whatever 
issues stem from their interaction with the criminal system.239 Padilla, Lafler, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. See supra Part I.A. 
 234. None of the interviewees from New York City worked for the Bronx Defenders.  
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 237. See supra Part III.A. 
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625 (2006); Steinberg, supra note 235. 
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Frye have given advocates fodder to call for greater resources.240 My research sup-
ports these calls for funds and attention. The data demonstrates the depth of the 
entanglement between the criminal case and collateral consequences in the actual 
practice of criminal defense. A public defender is now a provider of a range of legal 
services, and the way we envision public defense and fund it must catch up to the 
reality on the ground. 
In a post-Padilla world, all of the public defenders I spoke to had received training 
on the intersection of immigration and criminal law. All defenders also reported that 
they had access to resources—mostly very good resources in their estimation—when 
it came to answering questions on immigration consequences.241  
After Padilla, most public defender organizations have some formalized process 
for training their line attorneys on how to deal with immigration consequences in 
practice. Some offices have in-house immigration lawyers who are readily available 
to attorneys for questions that come up during their day-to-day practice. The public 
defenders I spoke to in New York City reported that they all have nearly round-the-
clock access to immigration attorneys. This is an ideal model for holistic practice, 
although it has not yet been adopted in all—or most—other public defense offices. 
In Los Angeles, for instance, there is a centrally located immigration expert available 
to answer questions from state public defenders,242 but no embedded experts in the 
individual defender offices. Other public defender organizations have statewide 
systems, where line defenders in different counties can call or email a set of attorneys 
who work on immigration issues for all public defenders in that state. This is the 
system that the attorneys I spoke to in Colorado, Washington, and Massachusetts use. 
This system does not have the immediacy of the in-house system, but most attorneys 
report being satisfied with the timeliness and level of information they receive. Other 
states and counties vary.243 Some, for instance, partner with immigration law 
nonprofits, which provide attorneys with immigration advice.244  
In contrast, when it comes to other collateral consequences outside of 
immigration, training and resources are largely hit or miss. Resources are available 
in a variety of places, but rarely in one centralized location. Defenders tend to cobble 
together information as needed to answer a particular question for a client. Some call 
around to social service organizations when the questions are particularly pressing245 
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or search the web, trying to locate the answer. Some excellent resources have 
developed recently to help defenders and the public identify collateral conse-
quences,246 but even these resources require time and some basic knowledge (for 
instance, an understanding or hunch that a particular crime may lead to a particular 
consequence) to navigate. And yet, public defenders regularly make these efforts in 
order to meet client needs that are well outside of the scope of the formal criminal 
case. As one defender put it, they are constantly trying to access and drum up 
resources.247  
Then there are the defenders who become experts in a particular area because of 
a chosen specialty or, more likely, the happenstance of having dealt with many cases 
that carry a specific consequence. Some defenders, for instance, reported that they 
were very knowledgeable about issues involving driver’s licenses because those 
questions came up so frequently in practice,248 while others were experts in sex 
offender registration.249 Defenders who work with juveniles get to know all the po-
tential effects that flow from a criminal case for young defendants.250 These defend-
ers then become a resource for their colleagues on a certain collateral consequence. 
This sort of searching around for information among defenders is clearly not ideal. 
It is a time drain to search for answers for these additional questions. It is no secret 
that most defenders are already overworked and underfunded.251 Searching for an 
answer, often in the dark, takes time and energy away from other critical tasks. It 
also means that many of these questions fall through the cracks as defenders triage 
cases—an unfortunate but necessary part of the job. This method of research also 
does not yield optimal or even decent answers. Unlike legal research, which 
defenders learn to do in law school and continue to hone in practice, it is less clear 
how these searches are supposed to proceed. As a result, the defender may or may 
not get the right answer for the client.  
The offices that get the best results from the defenders’ perspective are, not 
surprisingly, the larger organizations, where there is greater access to resources, 
experts, and fellow defenders with prior experience. The value of large organizations 
is particularly clear in relation to immigration law, as defenders have access to on-
call immigration lawyers, but these defenders have access to more resources and 
information about other types of collateral consequences as well. Those public de-
fenders I interviewed who are practicing in New York seemed to feel the most con-
fident about their ability to give advice on a range of collateral consequences outside 
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of immigration.252 It appears that, for the purposes of collateral consequences, the 
bigger the better.253 
Public defender organizations are already growing and becoming more 
bureaucratic.254 This a good thing. The larger the organization, the more institutional 
knowledge to draw from and the greater the resources.255 As Ronald Wright notes, 
increased bureaucracy is a trend in the structure of legal organizations, but 
particularly among public defender offices.256 His prediction that Padilla would in-
crease the size of defender organizations in certain places with a high percentage of 
foreign-born residents seems to have been borne out.257 Public defender offices in 
New York City have taken on many additional attorneys with a specialization in 
immigration law. But with the exception of those offices that provide truly holistic 
services, offices have yet to evolve to provide for other areas of need—namely, a full 
understanding of collateral consequences.  
I am aware that the cost of growth is tremendous. There are other critical and 
immediate needs for public defender offices, including additional lawyers, better 
case management infrastructure, and improved investigation services. I mean here to 
sound the bell again that holistic services should be the future for public defense. 
Given the increased awareness about collateral consequences, state and county 
governments should embrace a holistic public defender model, where services and 
resources are moved in-house. We can no longer pretend that public defenders are 
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Queens Law Associates, New York County Defender Services and Neighborhood Defenders 
of Harlem. Finally, a private attorney contract program, known as “18-B” (from the section of 
the New York County Law that establishes the program) provides additional conflict coverage 
for defendants in need of appointed counsel. King County, Washington, reports that in 2015 
the Department of Public Defense represented more than 20,000 clients. Representing Clients 
in Our Community, KING COUNTY, http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts 
/public-defense/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/LP8E-G6HH].  
 254. Wright & Peeples, supra note 59, at 1229. 
 255. Although, it is important to note here that this move towards increased size will ex-
clude rural areas, which in general have limited ability to increase their scope. Lisa R. Pruitt 
& Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 227–29 (2010) (discussing the difficulties that rural areas face in funding 
and developing public defender offices).  
 256. Wright, supra note 243, at 1525–26 (providing a breakdown of type of public de-
fender office (county or state) and the median number of attorneys at each and noting that 
“[t]he majority of public defenders today work in large, complex organizations” and that  
“[a]ccording to a 2007 national census, there were 957 PD offices operating in the United 
States, with 427 offices funded and controlled at the state level, and 530 controlled and pri-
marily funded at the local or county level”). 
 257. Id. at 1542. 
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merely criminal lawyers when the system demands so much more of them and they 
are striving to meet those demands.258 This is particularly true in light of Padilla, 
Lafler, and Frye, which put the onus on defenders to effectively plea bargain. If de-
fenders are to negotiate “creatively,” as Padilla instructs, then they must have the 
resources to do so.259  
CONCLUSION  
The data here should raise questions about the training of attorneys both in 
practice and in law school. We must re-envision what it means to be a criminal 
lawyer. The current model of legal education stresses trial skills, the rules of evi-
dence, and the intricacies of procedure. These skills remain critical. In fact, as de-
fenders in these interviews noted, the way many of them secure good bargains is by 
knowing the law and not being afraid of a trial. The power of the trial as a bargaining 
chip is clear. But criminal attorneys today are, more generally, negotiators. And yet, 
they are not getting negotiation training or a sense that negotiation is a skill that 
requires as much attention and practice as effectively cross-examining a police 
officer. We should now define good defense work as the creative resolution of client 
problems through negotiation.  
As the role of the attorney evolves from adversarial fighter to backroom 
negotiator, we also must acknowledge that the culture that attends the adversarial 
model—two players “duking it out” to win—no longer works in a system that is 
based almost entirely on negotiation. While negotiation certainly has elements of 
tension and struggle, it also involves making compromises and finding solutions. 
Yet, although negotiation is the primary means by which we resolve cases in our 
criminal system, “winning” still dominates the culture of criminal practice. This 
mismatch between the professional mindset and the reality of practice creates worse 
outcomes for defendants and less efficiency in the system more generally. This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 258. One other solution is to move some of these roles out of the public defender office. 
There have, for instance, been pleas to start a public defender office for immigrants in de-
portation proceedings, and, in New York City, the Immigrant Justice Corps is already doing 
this work. As Ingrid Eagly suggests in her piece, Gideon’s Migration, Gideon, which assured 
defendants a right to counsel in some cases, should expand to cover the defense of immigrants 
in removal proceedings since even very minor crimes may result in deportation. Eagly, supra 
note 242, at 2301. New York has pushed to extend Gideon, and the New York Assembly has 
increased the budget for civil legal services in the hopes of rolling out a right to counsel in 
civil cases where some kind of fundamental right is involved, including housing, benefits, and 
custody. See Joel Stashenko, Legislature’s Resolution Supports Civil Gideon, N.Y.L.J., June 
29, 2015, https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8ff83a05-03e7 
-4c4c-a309-f118510c6cd5/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/ZP6P-JJTK] (reporting on 
New York’s massive funding increase for civil legal services in the state, with an eye toward 
providing representation for all litigants in “essentials of life” cases, including housing, 
healthcare, education, family matters, and benefits). 
 259. Although it is outside the scope of this Article, I also advocate for district attorneys’ 
offices to adopt collateral consequences plea policies—like the one in Los Angeles County. 
See supra note 168. The effect of a formal policy, however, is up in the air given the tremen-
dous variation among how district attorneys handle cases.  
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research informs a new view of attorneys, but perhaps also a changing vision of the 
adversarial process.  
APPENDIX 
Table 1. Interview Number, Location, and Number of Years in Practice in Criminal Law 
Interview Location Years 
Interview 1 New York, NY 8–11 years 
Interview 2 Brooklyn, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 3 New York, NY 8–11 years 
Interview 4 New York, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 5 New York, NY 8–11 years 
Interview 6 New York, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 7 New York, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 8 New York, NY 9–11 years 
Interview 9 New York, NY 9–11 years 
Interview 10 New York, NY 24–27 years 
Interview 11 New York, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 12 New York, NY 16–19 years 
Interview 13 Brooklyn, NY 0–3 years 
Interview 14 Brooklyn, NY 0–3 years 
Interview 15 King County, WA 12–15 years 
Interview 16 Middlesex County, MA 4–6 years 
Interview 17 Middlesex County, MA 8–11 years 
Interview 18 King County, WA 8–11 years 
Interview 19 El Paso County, CO 0–3 years 
Interview 20 El Paso County, CO 4–7 years 
Interview 21 Bronx, NY 4–7 years 
Interview 22 El Paso County, CO 8–11 years 
Interview 23 El Paso County, CO 0–3 years 
Interview 24 King County, WA 4–7 years 
Interview 25 El Paso County, CO 0–3 years 
 
